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Justice Holmes' observation that "the life of the law has not
been logic, it has been experience,"' could have been written with
today's antitrust lawyer in mind. Although experience has lived up
to its reputation as a "dear" teacher in antitrust, it can claim the
title of "best" teacher only by default. Despite an incubation period
spanning more than three-quarters of a century, the courts, enforce-
ment agencies, lawyers and businessmen are still brooding over the
nature and meaning of antitrust. Instead of evolving precise stan-
dards, or refining meaningful guidelines, decisions commonly have
hatched new confusion and have unsettled areas which had been
generally understood to be well settled. Nowhere has this fact been
more apparent than in the law relating to restrictive dealing arrange-
ments between suppliers and their customers-specifically, so-called
exclusive dealing, tying and reciprocity.2
I. THE LABEL LABYRINTH
A major cause of this confusion has been a blind preoccupation
with labels in an effort to simplify, or eliminate entirely, problem-
solving on an ad hoc basis--often leading to what Justice Fortas
(prior to his appointment to the bench) referred to as the "no-think
school" of antitrust jurisprudence.3 Traditionally, tying is defined
as the sale or lease of one commodity on the condition that one or
more separate and distinctly different commodities are also pur-
chased or leased. Exclusive dealing is defined as the sale or lease
of a commodity on the condition that the purchaser/lessee not
deal in such commodities of a competitor, that is, that he agree to
deal exclusively in the commodities of the seller/lessor. Reciprocity
is said to involve a purchase conditioned on a reciprocal sale--com-
monly expressed as the understanding that "I will buy from you if
you will buy from me," or more pointedly, "I will not buy from
* Professor of Law, the Ohio State University.
1 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMION LAw 1 (1881).
2 Evidence of the extent of the confusion and controversy in this area of antitrust
law may be found in the prodigious amount of writings it has generated over the years.
Comprehensive bibliographies relevant to each of the restrictive dealing topics discussed
in this paper may be found in S. OrPENIHNEM AND G. WgsroN, FEDERAL Arrrrusr LAws
(1968).
s Fortas, 23 A.B.A. ATrrnusr SEcrnoN 823, 828 (1963).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
you unless you buy from me." The failure to recognize the func-
tional similarities as well as the distinctions between these various
distribution practices and the relation of each to the others has con-
tributed unnecessarily to the problem of establishing workable stan-
dards of legality:
Placed in their proper context, all of these practices may be
viewed as means to accomplish partial integration of the parties--
integration, in the sense that control over the operations of separate
entities is consolidated; partial, to the extent that the resulting con-
trol is incomplete. Historically, mainly because of the limited thrust
of Clayton Act section 3,4 the primary antitrust concern has been
with such integration of the forward-vertical type-restrictions im-
posed on a buyer by his seller. However, these practices may be of
the backward-vertical type-restrictions imposed on a seller by his
buyer-or reciprocal backward and forward restrictions that mutu-
ally circumscribe the marketing practices of both parties.
These three restrictive dealing practices also have in common
the use of bargaining power in the sale, purchase, or lease of one
product as "leverage" either to secure the purchase, sale, or lease of
an additional product or products or to require the convenantee
not to deal with competitors of the covenantor. To call one, but not
the others, "tying" is therefore deceptively misdescriptive. The dis-
tinguishing feature is not that "leverage" is used for tying, but that
in so-called "tie-ins" the dealing in one product is conditioned on
dealing in a different product rather than in more of the same prod-
uct as in "exclusive dealing," or in different products sold by the
respective parties to each other as in "reciprocity." It would be more
accurate to say that each of these three practices is merely a different
form of "tying" accomplished through a different application of
leverage.
The term "exclusive dealing" is no less misdescriptive. First,
the evil common to each of these restrictive dealing practices is said
to be the elimination of freedom of choice in the restricted cove-
nantor to deal in competing products "on their merits," and the
resulting foreclosure of the covenantee's competitors from compe-
4 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to lease or make a sale or
contract for sale of goods . . . on the condition . . . that thc lessee or pur-
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor or com-
petitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale or contract
for sale ... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce. (emphasis added.)
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tition in the "tied" products. Therefore, because each is condemned
for its "foreclosure" effect, all are properly described as different
forms of exclusive dealing. Second, confusion is compounded when
the term "exclusive dealing" is used to distinguish restrictions on
the buyer from restrictions on the seller. Again, both are forms of
exclusive dealing. More descriptive labels would be either "exclu-
sive buying" or "requirements contracts," for restrictions on buyers,
and either "exclusive selling" or "output contracts," for restrictions
on sellers. Finally, to the extent that the word "exclusive" denotes
absolute foreclosure it is inaccurate when applied to partial, rather
than full, output or requirements restrictions. The degree of exclu-
sivity will vary according to the scope of the restrictions: The longer
they run, the greater the geographical area covered, and the more
products and parties "tied up" by such arrangements with the same
or competing parties, the greater the possibility that competition
will be substantially foreclosed.
Although it is obvious that these restrictive dealing practices
may be used alone or in many different combinations with widely
differing purposes and competitive effects, the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the courts have persistently adhered to the traditional
classifications and definitions, with the result that the standard of
legality has often depended upon the label attached to the particular
conduct under consideration. Tying and, by analogy, reciprocity
have received harsher treatment than exclusive dealing arrangements,
mainly because of a judicially modified "extension-of-monopoly"
theory of tying which is inapplicable to exclusive dealing.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE LAw
A. Tying-The Quantitative Substantiality Test
Stated simply, under the extension-of-monopoly theory, monop-
oly power in one (tying) market is said to be used as a lever to fore-
close competition in, or to extend the monopoly to, a second (tied)
market by conditioning the sale or lease of the monopoly (tying)
product on the purchase or lease of a second (tied) product. The
genesis of the extension-of-monopoly theory of tying may be traced
at least as far back as the Supreme Court's 1917 decision in Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,5 in which the Court
reversed its prior position to hold that it is beyond the scope of the
statutory patent monopoly, and is therefore patent misuse, to tie
unpatented supplies to the sale or lease of a patented machine.
5 243 US. 502 (1917).
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The idea that it is an unjustified extension of a patent to use
the statutory monopoly as a lever to foreclose competition in a dif-
ferent (tied) market was subsequently utilized to find antitrust vio-
lations, reaching its apex in the virtually per se test promulgated
in International Salt Co. v. United States.6 International had leased
its patented salt-dispensing machines on the condition that the les-
sees purchase from it all of their salt requirements for use in the
leased machines. In unanimously upholding a judgment that Inter-
national's patent tying arrangement violated both Clayton Act sec-
tion 3 and Sherman Act section 1,7 the Court stated that it is "un-
reasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market."" The requisite "substantial" foreclosure was found in the
fact that the volume of business affected was about 500,000 dollars
in salt annually.9 The essentially per se nature of this "quantitative
substantiality" test is evident from the fact that no effort was made
to determine whether International possessed a dominant position
in the tying market (salt machines), or whether it had foreclosed a
substantial percentage share of the tied market (salt) generally.10
In non-patent tying cases, the controversy continued to center
on the degree of power in the tying product, or the amount of fore-
closure in the tied product, necessary to establish a violation. The
Court initially indicated that different tests would apply under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. As stated by Justice Clark, for the five-
to-four majority in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States:
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market
for the "tying" product, or if a substantial volume of commerce
in the "tied" product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates
the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act be-
0 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964):
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ... .
8 332 U.S. 892, 396 (1947).
9 Id. at 895.
10 As the Court later pointed out,
It was not established that equivalent machines were unobtainable, It was
not indicated what proportion of the business of supplying such machines was
controlled by defendant, and it was deemed irrelevant that there was no evi-
dence as to the actual effect of the tying clauses upon competition.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 37 U.S. 293, 805 (1949). In fact, International
offered to prove, and the Government did not controvert, that satisfactory substitutes
for its salt machines were available from competitors, but the Court deemed such
proof irrelevant. See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 856 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958).
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cause from either factor the requisite potential lessening of com-
petition is inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist
it is "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any
substantial market," a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of
the Sherman Act whenever both conditions are met.L
Any thought that mere "product differentiation" alone would sup-
ply the requisite leverage was flatly rejected. According to Justice
Clark:
[I]he essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of
monopolistic leverage; a seller exploits his dominant position in
one market to expand his empire into the next. Solely for testing
the strength of that lever, the whole and not part of a relevant
market must be assigned controlling weight.'-
Thus, according to Times-Picayune, whereas a patent may be "prima
facie evidence of [market] control," in other cases the determination
of dominance in the tying product "must rest on comparative mar-
keting data."'13
This apparent gap between the tests for patent and non-patent
tying cases was closed in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States,'4
where Justice Black, speaking for the five-to-four majority, held that
both types of cases were equally subject to the "per se" test of Inter-
national Salt. Indeed, he felt that in the latter case, "[i]f anything, the
Court held the challenged tying arrangements unlawful despite the
fact that the tying item was patented, not because of it."'1 Although
his opinion loosely refers to tying as "per se" illegal, Justice Black
made it clear that more is required than merely proving the exis-
tence of tying:
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the
tying product so that it does not represent an effectual weapon
11 345 US. 594, 608-09 (1953).
12 Id. at 611.
13 Id. Significantly, the basic disagreement expressed in Justice Burton's dissenting
opinion (joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Minton) was not in thc majoritys
dual test, but in its factual finding that Times-Picayune did not enjoy a "dominant
position" in the New Orleans newspaper advertising market by "including all thre
[morning and evening] papers, as a single market." Id. at 628. Justice Burton felt
that morning newspaper advertising was a separate market from evening advertising,
and viewed Times-Picayune as exercising its monopoly power in the only morning
paper as a lever to foreclose advertising competition with its evening paper by using
a "combination rate" to tie the sale of advertising in its morning paper to simul-
taneous advertising in its evening paper.
14 356 US. 1 (1958).
15 Id. at 9.
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to pressure buyers into taking the tied item any restraint of trade
attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be in-
significant at most. As a simple example, if one of a dozen food
stores in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the
buyer also took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain competi-
tion in sugar if its competitors were ready and able to sell flour
by itself.16
On the other hand, the references in Times-Picayune to "monopoly
power" and "dominance" in the tying product were interpreted by
Justice Black as requiring only "sufficient economic power to impose
an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product."'17
In Northern Pacific, the railroad had included "preferential
routing" clauses in its contracts of sale or leases of land along its tracks.
These clauses required the vendee or lessee to ship via Northern all
commodities produced or manufactured on the land, at least where
its rates and services were equal to those of competing carriers. No
attempt was made to define the nature or scope of the relevant ty-
ing (land) market, nor to determine Northern's relative share of that
market. Apparently it was assumed that the inherent "uniqueness"
of each parcel of land, and the "host" of tying clauses involved in
the sale or lease of "at least several million acres," provided "suffi-
cient economic power" to impose the proscribed restraint.18
Curiously, the Court ignored the question of competitive effect
in the tied market-transportation, or transportation of commodities
from the tying land. The Court did not indicate the degree to which
competition in transportation was foreclosed, the number of rail-
16 Id. at 6-7.
17 Id. at 11.
18 According to Justice Black, "the very existence of this host of tying arrange-
ments is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power, at least where,
as here, no other explanation has been offered for the existence of these restraints."
Id. at 7-8. The theory that each parcel of land, having "unique" attributcs, necessarily
supplied "sufficient economic power" was disputed by Justice Harlan in his dissent.
He would have required
evidence of the relative strength of appellants' landholdings vis.-vis that of
others in the appropriate market for land of the types now or formerly pos.
sessed by appellants, or the "uniqueness" of appellants' landholdings in terms
of quality or use to which they may have been put, and of the extent to which
the location of the lands on or near the Northern Pacific's railroad line, or
any other circumstances, put the appellants in a strategic position as against
other sellers and lessors of land. Id. at 16.
See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAR'.
L. REv. 50, 52-54 (1958); Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New
Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. Rxv. 88, 109.
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roads (or of other forms of transportation), if any, that competed
with Northern in servicing the land, all of which was adjacent to
its tracks, or what commodities, or how much of each, were shipped
from the tying land. The conspicuous absence of proof of any of
these questions, without objection from an otherwise vigorous dis-
sent,19 suggests that the Court, both majority and dissent, considered
the only material issue to be one of "sufficient economic power" to
impose the tying restriction. Minimally, this would amount to elim-
inating, sub silentio, the Times-Picayune distinction between the
Clayton and Sherman Act tests for tying. No longer would the Sher-
man Act require a showing of both the proscribed power and effect,
but proof of power alone would suffice, as under the Clayton Act's
incipiency standard. Considering the apparent ease of proving the
requisite power under the majority view, the net effect of Northern
Pacific is that tying arrangements are virtually per se illegal under
the Sherman Act as well as under the Clayton Act.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Court's most recent deci-
sion involving movie block-booking. In United States v. Loew's
Inc.,20 the Court held that conditioning the license or sale of copy-
righted feature films upon the acceptance by a television station of
a package containing unwanted or inferior copyrighted films was an
unlawful tying arrangement under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Similar tying arrangements between film distributors and movie
theaters previously had been banned in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.,21 by analogy to the patent tying cases. Appellants in
Loew's sought to distinguish the Paramount holding on the ground
that the "uniqueness" attributable to copyrighted films in that case
was lost when sold for television use. Such films were said to consti-
tute less than eight percent of television programming and were
"reasonably interchangeable" with other program material, includ-
ing other feature films. Consequently, they argued that the evidence
19 For the dissenters, Justice Harlan contended that more was required than
merely the "ad hoc 'dominance"' possessed by any seller in his own tying product
to establish the requisite "market control." 356 U.S. at 15-16. While agreeing that
"monopoly power" was not needed, he felt that the "economic power" sufficient to
supply this leverage would be a matter of proof, based upon such factors as
significant percentage control of the relevant market, desirability of the
product to the purchaser, use of tying clauses which would be likely to result
in economic detriment to vendees or lessees, and such uniqueness of the tying
product as to suggest comparison with a monopoly by patent. Id. at 19.
20 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
21 34 US. 131 (1948).
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
did not support a finding of "sufficient economic power" in the tying
product.
In rejecting this contention, Justice Goldberg concluded for the
Court that the existence of competing substitutes for the tying prod-
uct was insufficient to alter the distinctiveness of the copyrighted
films. As explained by Justice Goldberg, "the crucial economic power
may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers
or from uniqueness in its attributes." 22 Particularly revealing is the
footnote expansion of this theory:
Since the requisite economic power may be found on the
basis of either uniqueness or consumer appeal, and since market
dominance in the present context does not necessitate a demon-
stration of market power in the sense of § 2 of the Sherman Act,
it should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark
upon a full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant
market for the tying product and into the corollary problem of
the seller's percentage share in that market.23
If the test in the tying-product market is merely one of "unique-
ness or consumer appeal," should a similarly narrow definition of
the line of commerce be followed in determining the amount of
foreclosure in the tied-product market? If the "uniqueness" test for
copyrighted tying films were applied to the copyrighted tied films,
there could be no foreclosure of competition resulting from the tie-
in because, by that standard, there could be no competition with the
"unique" tied films to be foreclosed.24 Here, however, the Court
demonstrated its agility by defining the tied-product market more
broadly to encompass other programming material, including other
copyrighted fims, thereby enabling it to find the requisite foreclo-
sure of competition in the tied-product market. According to Justice
Goldberg, "the distinctiveness of the copyrighted tied product is not
inconsistent with the fact of competition, in the form of other pro-
gramming material and other films, which is suppressed by the tying
arrangements." 25 Having defined the tying-product market narrowly
enough to establish "power," and the tied-product market broadly
enough to demonstrate possible foreclosure of competition, the
22 371 U.S. at 45.
23 Id. at 45 n.4.
24 See Adams, The Legality of Compulsory Package Licensing of Patents, 12 ANI.
TRUST BuLs. 773, 782-83 (1967).
25 371 U.S. at 49.
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Court then fell back on a loose "quantitative" test for finding the
proscribed effect.28
The net result of Loew's is a test as near to per se illegality as
one can get without denying the possibility of any exception. Al-
though Justice Goldberg left open the possibility of "rare circum-
stances" in which the per se test might not apply under the Sherman
Act to tying arrangements involving patented or copyrighted prod-
ucts, he found it "difficult to conceive of such a case." - Indeed,
under the flexible criteria of Loew's, it would be difficult to conceive
of any tying arrangement which logically could not be found to be
illegal upon a minimal showing of a "distinctive" tying product and
a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied product.
B. Exclusive Dealing-The Comparative Substantiality Test
The question whether the "quantitative substantiality" test of
International Salt also would apply to requirements contracts was
faced in the Court's celebrated Standard Stations decision, Standard
Oil Co. v. United States.21 In upholding the district court's finding
of a Clayton Act violation, Justice Frankfurter, for the five-to-four
majority, stated the issue to be
whether the requirement of showing that the effect of the agree-
ments "may be to substantially lessen competition" may be met
simply by proof that a substantial portion of commerce is
affected or whether it must also be demonstrated that competi-
tive activity has actually diminished or probably will diminish.2 0
Although he recognized that, under certain circumstances, re-
268 The 25 contracts found to have been illegally block booked involved
payments to appellants ranging from $60,800 in the case of Screen Gems to
over $2,500,000 in the case of Associated Artists. A substantial portion of the
licensing fees represented the cost of the inferior films which the stations were
required to accept. Id.
Thus, the actual value of the tied films was not determined. The government itself
maintained that the evidence established that many were "unsalable" or "unusable."
Brief for United States at 36. If the tied films were of such low value, it may be
questioned whether the license fees for the entire packages represented more than
an insubstantial dollar amount, and whether a substantial amount of competition in
the tied product market was affected even under an expanded test of "quantitative
substantiality." See Adams, supra note 24, at 781-82.
27 871 US. at 49-50.
28 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
29 Id. at 299.
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quirements contracts could be harmless, or even beneficial, Justice
Frankfurter believed that
to demand that bare inference be supported by evidence as to
what would have happened but for the adoption of the practice
*.. or to require firm prediction of an increase of competition
as a probable result of ordering the abandonment of the prac-
tice, would be a standard of proof, if not virtually impossible to
meet, at least most ill-suited for ascertainment by courts.80
He concluded, therefore, that "the qualifying clause of § 3 is satisfied
by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share
of the line of commerce affected." 31
Although the Standard Stations test is often referred to as
"quantitative," the language just quoted as well as the evidence
underlying the decision indicates that it is not "quantitative" in the
International Salt sense (i.e., an absolute, dollar amount) but is one
of comparative substantiality (i.e., relative percentage share of mar-
ket foreclosure). Such a "comparative substantiality" test, though
short of a full-scale Rule-of-Reason inquiry into market performance,
certainly provides a more qualitative measure of actual and probable
foreclosure than does the simplistic quantitative test. Furthermore,
in predicting the probable effects of the requirements contracts in
Standard Stations the Court stressed the following additional factors:
that Standard was a "major" competitor, though not "dominant;"
that the discrepancy in bargaining power of Standard vis- t-vis the
dealers indicated "coercion" of the latter; that "all the other major
suppliers have also been using requirements contracts, and ... that
the relative share of the business which fell to each has remained
about the same during the period of their use." The combination of
these factors, in addition to the foreclosure of a comparatively sub-
stantial share of the tied-product market, gave rise to the inference
"that their effect has been to enable the established suppliers indi-
vidually to maintain their own standing and at the same time collec-
tively, even though not collusively, to prevent a late arrival from
wresting away more than an insignificant portion of the market."82
That Standard Stations did not establish a per se, or absolute,
quantitative substantiality test for requirements contracts is sub-
stantiated by the Court's 1953 decision in FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co.83 In upholding the Commission's cease and de-
30 Id. at 309-10.
81 Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added).
33 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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sist order under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 4
Justice Douglas, for the seven-to-two majority, accepted the Com-
mission's finding that standard, one-year, exclusive-dealing contracts
with motion-picture exhibitors of advertising films "would not be an
undue restraint upon competition, in view of the compelling busi-
ness reasons for some exclusive arrangement."3 5 In language sugges-
tive of the Rule-of-Reason approach, he noted that "[t]he point
where a method ofcompetition becomes 'unfair' within the mean-
ing of the Act will often turn on the exigencies of a particular situa-
tion, trade practices, or the practical requirements of the business
in question.",'3 Justice Douglas did not even mention Standard Sta-
tions, wherein such justifications were apparently considered im-
material.
Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, went even further than the
majority by criticizing the one-year limitation on the exclusive deal-
ing contracts. He interpreted his prior opinion for the majority in
Standard Stations as not supporting a finding of undue restraint in
the exclusive-dealing contracts covering periods beyond one year3
In particular, he noted the lack of evidence regarding (1) the num-
ber of contracts extending beyond the one-year "reasonable" period;
(2) the percentage share of the market foreclosed by these contracts;
(3) economic duress from unequal bargaining power of the seller
vis-h-vis the exhibitors; (4) the effect on the exhibitors of the con-
tracts covering the advertising which, unlike Standard Stations, was
"not the central business of the theaters and apparently account[ed]
for only a small part of the theaters' revenues"; and (5) the degree
of "exclusiveness" of the contract provisions.33
The Court's final move in the direction of a qualitative ap-
proach to requirements contracts came in Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co.39 Justice Clark, for the seven-to-two majority,
outlined the procedure to be followed in "exclusive dealing" cases:
First, the line of commerce, i.e., the type of goods, wares, or
merchandise, etc., involved must be determined, where it is in
controversy, on the basis of the facts peculiar to the case. Sec-
34 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964):
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptivc acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.
35 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 398-403.
38 Id. at 398, 401-03.
39 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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ond, the area of effective competition in the known line of com-
merce must be charted by careful selection of the market area
in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can
practicably turn for supplies. In short, the threatened foreclosure
of competition must be in relation to the market affected ....
Third, and last, the competition foreclosed by the contract
must be found to constitute a substantial share of the relevant
market. That is to say, the opportunities for other traders to
enter into or remain in that market must be significantly lim-
ited .... 4V
In flatly rejecting a dollar figure as the test, Justice Clark
adopted qualitative criteria for measuring the effect on competi-
tion:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary
to weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area
of effective competition, taking into account the relative strength
of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved
in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant mar-
ket area, and the probable immediate and future effects which
pre-emption of that share of the market might have on effective
competition therein. It follows that a mere showing that the con-
tract itself involves a substantial number of dollars is ordinarily
of little consequence.4 1
Significantly, although the relevant market was defined in such
a way as to make the percentage foreclosure of competition relatively
insubstantial, Justice Clark did not attempt to distinguish Standard
Stations on that ground but went on to consider mitigating circum-
stances to justify the requirements contract. In distinguishing prior
holdings he pointed out that here the seller did not possess "a dom-
inant position in the market"; that the contracts did not cover "myr-
iad outlets with substantial sales volume, coupled with an industry-
wide practice of relying upon exclusive contracts"; and that it was
not "a plainly restrictive tying arrangement. ' '42 Instead, quoting from
the economic distinctions suggested but seemingly rejected in Stan-
dard Stations, he concluded that
we seem to have only that type of contract which "may well be
of economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers." In the
case of the buyer it "may assure supply," while on the part of
the seller it "may make possible the substantial reduction of sell-
40 Id. at 527-28.
41 Id. at 329.
42 Id. at 34.
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ing expenses, give protection against price fluctuations, and...
offer the possibility of a predictable market." 43
Referring to the twenty-year period of the requirements contract,
"singled out as the principal vice," Justice Clark thought that "at
least in the case of public utilities the assurance of a steady and
ample supply of fuel is necessary in the public interest."44
The Court's flexible approach to requirements contracts, as
opposed to tying, is more evident when it is remembered that
Tampa's requirements contracts were upheld under the Clayton
Act section 3 incipiency test, and that the one-year limitations in
such contracts were approved in Motion Picture Advertising under
the even broader test of FTC Act section 5. This distinction was
pointed up in Justice Clark's conclusion:
We need not discuss the respondents' further contention
that the contract also violates § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act,
for if it does not fall within the broader proscription of § 3 of
the Clayton Act it follows that it is not forbidden by those of
the former.45
Although Tampa Electric revived the element of flexibility
missing in a rigid quantitative substantiality test, it failed to estab-
lish meaningful guidelines for future conduct. The opinion not only
suffers from vague generalities, but the Court's own ad hoc ap-
praisal lacks "clear reasoning" regarding the question whether in fact
the requirements contract was needed under the circumstances, or
whether more reasonable alternatives were available to accomplish
the legitimate purposes.46
A far more pertinent criticism of the Tampa Electric opinion
is its failure to recognize the arrangement for what it really was-
a reciprocal output-requirements contract. Ironically, the Court was
not asked to enforce the exclusive-buying restrictions. To the con-
trary, the buyer was attempting to enforce the seller's obligation to
furnish its coal requirements as provided in the twenty-year supply
contract. In other words, the seller sought to avoid what in fact was
its partial output obligation by claiming the contract was an unlaw-
ful requirements contract. Under these circumstances it would have
been appropriate for the Court to have concluded that the legality of
43 Id. (citation omitted).
44 id.
45 Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
46 Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements
Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. Rrv. 267, 283-84.
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the buyer restrictions were irrelevant in an action by the buyer to
enforce different and severable contractual obligations on the seller. 4
Here, again, the Court apparently was ensnared in the label laby-
rinth of the "no-think" school. The result may have been correct,
but the rationale certainly leaves something to be desired.
It is singularly unfortunate that the Court did not consider the
restrictive selling, or partial output, limitation in Tampa Electric
in view of the sparse authority on the proper treatment of such
backward-integration restraints. The Court's 1944 decision in United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. 48 remains the only one in which
it directly considered the question. An agreement giving the dis-
tributor, Soft-Lite, the exclusive right to purchase for resale pink-
tinted lenses manufactured by Bausch & Lomb was upheld, without
opinion, by an equally divided Court. In the district court, Judge
Rifkind, in holding that this exclusive selling agreement did not
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, stated:
[he main purpose of the contract is to provide a source of
supply for Soft-Lite. The restraining covenant is for the pro-
tection of the purchaser who is spending large sums to develop
his good will and enlarge the public patronage of a relatively
new article of commerce. The arrangement, though not a part-
nership in legal form, is functionally a joint enterprise in which
one will produce and the other market the commodity.40
Judge Rifkind also noted that not only were there other competing
lenses in the market, but that competition had actually increased
by competitors' emulation of the success of Soft-Lite in its promo-
tion of defendant's product. 50
Since Bausch & Lomb, it has generally been assumed that such
selling agreements by a single seller are legal, absent monopoliza-
tion, a concerted boycott, or a horizontal conspiracy. Otherwise,
judicial concern for possible anticompetitive effects has arisen only
where exclusive selling involved some reciprocal restriction on the
buyer-notably, exclusive buying, exclusive territorial arrangements,
or customer allocation restrictions. 51
47 See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 US. 516 (1959); Beloit Culligan Soft Water
Service, Inc. v. Culligan, Inc., 274 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1959); New York Automatic Canteen
Corp. v. Automatic Canteen Co., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,625 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
48 321 US. 707 (1944).
49 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).
50 Id. at 399.
51 The district court in United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562




The applicable test of legality for reciprocity is a relatively new
and undeveloped area of judicial inquiry. The Commission issued
three cease and desist orders in the 1930's, finding coercive reciprocal
buying to be an unfair method of competition under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.5 2 Despite a continuing existence
of the practice in one form or another, the only judicial considera-
tion of the legality of reciprocity contracts (outside the merger field)
is a 1966 district court decision, United States v. General Dynamics
Corp.53
Renewed interest in the area was generated by the Supreme
Court's condemnation of reciprocity in upholding the Commission's
invalidation of a merger in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp."
Citing the tying cases-International Salt and Northern Pacific-
Justice Douglas, for the Court, stated that
the "reciprocity" made possible by such [a conglomerate] acqui-
sition is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at
which the antitrust laws are aimed. The practice results in "an
irrelevant and alien factor," ... intruding into the choice among
competing products, creating at the least "a priority on the busi-
ness at equal prices." 55
on sellers, as opposed to resale restrictions on buyers (as well as the confusion inherent
in loose labeling):
The terms "exclusive contracts,' "exclusive territories." or "exclusive
dealerships," frquently are used to mean (1) agreements by a manufacturer
with its distributors or dealers that the manufacturer will not sell to any
others within their respective "exclusive territories," or (2) (as in this cae)
agreements by distributors and dealers with their manufacturer or supplier
that they will not sell to purchasers located outside their respective assigned
"exclusive territories." It is most important to keep in mind these conflicting
definitions because agreements in the first category have been upheld as
reasonable when ancillary to the sale of goods for resale because they protect
the vendees property rights in his resale business from being destroyed or
damaged by the actions of his vendor who is in a position to undersell, or
establish a competitor of, his vendee. Id. at 578.
See also Brief for the United States at 24-25 n.12, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 US. 365 (1967); see generally Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under
The Antitrust Laws-A Reappraisal 40 N.C.L. REv. 223, 229-35 (1962). But cf. Hershey
Chocolate Corp. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941).
52 California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C.
67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
53 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
51 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
55 Id. at 594.
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Although Justice Douglas declined to rule that a probability of re-
ciprocal buying as a result of an acquisition, "no matter how small,"
would violate Clayton Act section 7,10 he concluded that "where,
as here, the acquisition is of a company that commands a substantial
share of a market, a finding of probability of reciprocal buying by
the Commission, whose expertise the Congress trusts, should be hon-
ored, if there is substantial evidence to support it."5
In General Dynamics, Judge Cannella recognized the deceptive-
label trap in noting that "reciprocity" is not a term of "fixed mean-
ing," but rather encompasses a "host of commercial practices,"
including reciprocal buying, which "covers a wide variety of rela-
tionships" ranging from "overt coercion to a mutual patronage
agreement wholly without such overtones."5' 8 In the case of coercive
reciprocal buying the analogy to tying was said to be obvious: the
"transference of purchasing power to inflate sales in other markets
accomplishes the same result condemned in 'tying-in' arrangements,
viz., a frustration of competitive criteria in determining which firms
receive which purchasing orders."8' 9 Less obvious, but according to
Judge Cannella equally Valid, is the analogy of mutual patronage
to tying. Countervailing "purchasing power is used by both parties
as a sales generating device, although no force is exerted from any
quarter."60 This analysis is significant for its hypothesis that it is
not the "abuse" of coercive leverage by one party on another which
is condemned, but the foreclosure of competition as a consequence
of market power possessed by either or both parties to the agree-
ment.
Turning to the evidence, Judge Cannella found that there was
a failure of proof of agreement in the bulk of reciprocal dealings
and that, in those instances where agreement was established, the
total amount of proven restrained trade totalled only $177,225.
Although the 500,000 dollars in International Salt was said to have
"no magical significance," he nevertheless (mistakenly 1) noted that
it was the lowest figure to date that had been designated as "not
insubstantial" and concluded that since the government had already
established that the merger itself violated the Sherman Act, "this
56 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
57 380 U.S. at 600.
58 258 F. Supp. at 57.
59 Id. at 66.
60 Id.
01 See note 26 supra and text accompanying note 18 supra.
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aspect of this case is an inappropriate vehicle for finding an amount
considerably less than $500,000 as 'not insubstantial.' ""
III. REs crivm DEA .ING AS UNFAIR COMPETMON
The use of the tying analogy in Consolidated Foods and Gen-
eral Dynamics is symptomatic of a trend to avoid the label barrier
by evolving a general "leverage" doctrine beyond the nominal the-
ories of tying, exclusive dealing and reciprocity. This approach has
been adopted by the Commission in challenging "quasi" tying con-
duct as an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.6 Section 5 has the advantage of
expansive flexibility, and applicability to incipient violations of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. As explained by the Court in Motion
Picture Advertising:
The "unfair methods of competition," which are con-
demned by § 5(a) of the Act, are not confined to those that
were illegal at common law or that were condemned by the
Sherman Act. Congress advisedly left the concept flexible to
be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from the
field of business. It is also dear that the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act was designed to supplement and bolster the Sher-
man Act and the Clayton Act-to stop in their incipiency acts
and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts,
as well as to condemn as "unfair methods of competition" exist-
ing violations of them.64
The scope of section 5 is thus three dimensional: (1) minimally,
all restraints in commerce which would violate the other antitrust
acts are within its coverage; (2) the incipiency test of section 5 may
prohibit conduct of the type included within the coverage of the
other antitrust laws even though it does not meet their standards
of actual or potential anticompetitive effects; and (8) conduct of a
type not included in the other antitrust laws may be prohibited.
The outer boundaries of the latter two dimensions of section 5 re-
main undefined.
A recent example of the Commission's section 5 approach is
found in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.65 For at least thirty years prior
to the Commission's 1959 complaint, Brown had undertaken a pro-
gram for "Brown Franchise Stores" whereby it granted special ser-
62 258 F. Supp. at 66-67.
63 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), text quoted note 34 supra.
64 344 US. 392, 394 (1953) (citations omitted).
,5 884 U.S. 316 (1966).
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vices and benefits to its independent retail shoe store customers as
an inducement for them to concentrate on the Brown shoe line,
and to refrain from stocking and selling competing shoes. The Com-
mission's cease and desist order was based on a quasi-tying theory:
Respondent's practice of conditioning the benefits of member-
ship in the plan to adherence to the restrictive terms of the fran.
chise agreement for the purpose of foreclosing other manufac-
turers from selling to its franchisees is akin to the operation of
tying clauses generally held as inherently anticompetitive.00
In setting aside the order and dismissing the complaint, Judge
Vogel, for the Ninth Circuit, rejected the Commission's tying anal-
ogy, stating:
While it is clear that a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate
commerce is involved here, that fact alone does not make peti-
tioner's program an "unfair" method of competition nor may
the selling activities of petitioner be described as "deceptive acts
or practices." In Brown there was no "sale" of the tying product(franchise services); there is no evidence that Brown's "power or
leverage" in the tying product was such as to force the purchase
of the "tied products" (shoes). This case presents a situation
where the seller, Brown, has no control or dominance over the
tying product, services; consequently, the Brown franchise pro-
gram is not an "effectual weapon" to pressure buyers into taking
the tied item, shoes.0 7
Judge Vogel also disagreed with the Commission's alternative reli-
ance on the Supreme Court's merger decision in Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States 8 as establishing proof of sufficient probable anti-
competitive impact to violate the Clayton Act's incipiency test.
Noting that the contractual franchise plan permitted the indepen-
dent retailers to withdraw at any time, he concluded that the plan
amounted to no more than the legitimate exercise of customer selec-
tion and sales promotion to secure dealer "loyalty." 60
On appeal, Justice Black, for a unanimous Court, stated the
issue to be
whether the Federal Trade Commission can declare it to be
an unfair practice for Brown, the second largest manufacturer
of shoes in the Nation, to pay a valuable consideration to hun-
dreds of retail shoe purchasers in order to secure a contractual
promise from them that they will deal primarily with Brown
66 Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679, 715 (1963).
67 Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45, 54 (9th Cir. 1964).
68 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
69 339 F.2d at 56.
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and will not purchase conflicting lines of shoes from Brown's
competitors.7 0
In upholding the Commission's finding of violation, "on the record
here," Justice Black rejected Brown's contention that the Commis-
sion should be required to prove that the effect of its restrictive
arrangements "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly" as required by Clayton Act section 3. Refer-
ring to Motion Picture Advertising, he reaffirmed the Commission's
"power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency with-
out proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the
Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws."7'
By compounding the Clayton Act's incipiency standard with
that of the FTC Act, Brown Shoe appears to be an open invitation
to the Commission to attack restrictive dealing practices (including
quasi-tying), as well as other "trade practices which conflict with
the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though
such practices may not actually violate these laws" 7-- in other words,
regardless of their effect on competition. However, dicta notwith-
standing, it should be noted that the record did disclose the quan-
titatively substantial foreclosure necessary to prove a (quasi) tying
violation, if not an unlawful requirements arrangement. 73 Consid-
ering the almost per se treatment of restrictive dealing practices
generally, it may be questioned whether even the broadest reading
170 384 US. at 320.
71 Id. at 322.
72 Id. at 321.
73 The court noted:
[A]dmissions of Brown as to the existence and operation of the franchise pro-
gram were buttressed by many separate detailed fact findings of a trial
examiner, one of which findings was that the franchise program effectively
foreclosed Brown's competitors from selling to a substantial number of retail
shoe dealers. Id. at 318-19.
Particularly revealing is the Court's footnote to this observation:
In its opinion the Commission found that the services provided by
Brown in its franchise program were the "prime motivation" for dealers to
join and remain in the program; that the program resulted in franchised
stores purchasing 75% of their total shoe requirements from Brown-the
remainder being for the most part shoes which were not "conflicting" lines,
as provided by the agreement; that the effect of the plan was to foreclose
retail outlets to Brown's competitors, particularly small manufacturers;, and
that enforcement of the plan was effected by teams of field men who called
upon the shoe stores, urged the elimination of other manufacturer' conflicting
lines and reported deviations to Brown who then cancelled under a provision
of the agreement. Id. at 319 n.2.
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of the Court's dicta in Brown Shoe would alter the law significantly,
if at all.
The prime example of the Commission's quasi-tying theory is
found in the extended and involved proceedings against the sales-
commission method of marketing automobile tires, batteries and
accessories (TBA). Under this distribution arrangement, an oil com-
pany receives a sales commission for assisting a tire company in
promoting the sale of the latter's TBA products to the oil company's
wholesale and retail outlets. In 1956, the Commission issued three
almost identical complaints, each pairing an oil company with a
tire company (Texaco with Goodrich, Shell with Firestone and At-
lantic with Goodyear), charging that their TBA sales-commission
plans violated section 5.74
The same hearing examiner heard all three cases, deciding that
the sales-commission method of selling TBA was lawful but that
Atlantic and Shell had unlawfully used overt coercion to force their
outlets to buy the "sponsored" TBA products. 75 The Commission
adopted the examiner's findings of overt coercion but further held
in both cases that the adverse competitive effects made the sales-
commission method of selling unlawful, even absent a tying agree-
ment or overt coercion. According to the Commission, the sales-
commission arrangement is "a classic example of the use of economic
power in one market (here, gasoline distribution) to destroy com-
petition in another market (TBA distribution)."7 0 Although the
Commision found that Texaco had sufficient economic power to
cause its outlets to purchase substantial amounts of sponsored TBA
"even without the use of overt coercive tactics," it remanded for
lack of "sufficient market data" to enable it to assess the competitive
effects of the sales-commission method of selling TBAY7 On remand,
the examiner found the Texaco plan unlawful, and the Commis-
sion affirmed on reasoning similar to that of the other two cases. It
then issued broad orders in all three proceedings enjoining the use
of the sales-commission plans (1) by respondents with each other,
(2) by each oil company with any other TBA supplier, and (3) by
each tire company with any other oil company.78 The real novelty
74 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309 (1961); Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 58 F.T.C. 371 (1961); B. F. Goodrich Co., 58 F.T.C. 1176 (1961).
75 Cases cited supra note 74.
7 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 367 (1961).
77 B. F. Goodrich Co., 58 F.T.C. 1176, 1178-79 (1961).
78 B. F. Goodrich & Texaco, Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1172, 1179 (1963).
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of these rulings is that, although courts had previously disfavored
this method of promoting TBA sales, they had gone no further than
to enjoin overt coercive acts.79 To the Commission, the "overt acts
of coercion" were "mere symptoms of a more fundamental restraint
of trade inherent in the sales commission itself."80
On appeal, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC,$' the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the Commission's Atlantic opinion and order;
in Texaco, Inc. v. FTC,8 2 the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the Commission's Texaco decision and ordered the complaint dis-
missed; and the Fifth Circuit withheld its decision on the appeal in
Shell pending final action by the Supreme Court in the companion
cases, which had been granted certiorari.11
In the Supreme Court Atlantic did not dispute the findings of
or the injunction against overt coercion, and the Court did not dis-
cuss these findings in detail . 4 However, in addition to finding "war-
rant in the record" for the Commission's conclusion that Atlantic
possessed economic power, or leverage, over its outlets, Justice Clark,
for the majority, emphasized that "that lever was bolstered by actual
threats and coercive practices."8 15 The foreclosure effect was likened
to that of a tying arrangement, and Justice Clark affirmed the Com-
mission's finding "that the effect of the plan was as though Atlantic
had agreed with Goodyear to require its dealers to buy Goodyear
products and had done so."8 With this ultimate finding he then
applied the quantitative substantiality test, concluding that "it is
beyond question that the effect on commerce was not insubstantial"
where more than 50 million dollars of sponsored TBA was sold
during the relevant six-year period and more than 5,500 outlets were
affected.87
As noted in the dissenting opinions of Justice Stewart (joined
by Justice Harlan) and Justice Goldberg, the Commission's opinion
79 See e.g., Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 963 (1961); United States v. Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959). But
cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,
350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965). See also 63 MicH. L. R v. 713 (1965).
80 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 348 (1961).
81 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964), aff'd sub nom., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381
U.S. 357 (1965).
82 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
83 Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966).
84 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 US. 357 (1965).
85 Id. at 369.
88 Id. at 370 (emphasis in original).
87 Id.
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
in Atlantic and its affirmance by the Court provide little in the way
of practical guidelines, and leave many significant questions unan-
swered. Although the Commission had limited its attack to the com-
mission-sales method of TBA distribution, the basis of its reasoning
was that Atlantic possessed "sufficient economic power" over its
wholesale and retail outlets "to cause them to purchase substantial
quantities of sponsored TBA even without the use of overt coercive
tactics or of written or oral tying agreements, and this power is a
fact existing independently of the particular method of distributing
or sponsoring TBA used by Atlantic.""" In other words, as Justice
Stewart pointed out, Atlantic's "competitive advantage" or "lever-
age" was "the inevitable result of the market structure"; i.e., the
"imbalance of economic power" between Atlantic and its distrib-
utors.8 9 Once this major premise is accepted, its logical minor
premise is that the Commission's order represents "a step toward
the total exclusion of Atlantic from the marketing of tires, bat-
teries, and accessories."' 9 The syllogism is completed by the neces-
sary conclusion that
[h]enceforth, large concerns marketing their products through
smaller distributors stand vulnerable to the charge that their
methods of competition are unfair because they have done no
more than add a complementary product to those already sold
through their distributors.9 '
The confusion over the meaning of Atlantic is evident in the
subsequent courts of appeals' decisions in Shell and Texaco. In each
of these cases the Commission contended that under Atlantic a TBA
sales-commission system is per se unlawful, while respondents argued
that Atlantic should be limited to its facts, including the findings of
overt acts of coercion. In Shell, Judge Wisdom, for the Fifth Circuit,
took the position that Atlantic "approached only to the brink of
holding TBA sales commission contracts per se unlawful."02 Specif-
ically, he found "three essential components" in Atlantic:
(1) the oil company's dominant economic power over its dealers;
(2) the exercise of that power over its dealers;
(3) the anti-competitive effects of using that power.93
88 Id. at 379 (dissenting opinion of Stewart, J.) (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 380-81.
o Id. at 380.
91 Id. at 381.




Understandably, the dispute centered on the second element-
what is the "exercise" of economic power? Although Judge Wisdom
noted that many "acts of persuasion or promotion" used by Atlantic
were matched by Shell, he found no substantial evidence of overt
coercion. However, not only did he deem it unnecessary to establish
overt coercion, but proof of its absence was taken as evidence that
the sales-commission plan is "inherently coercive and results in fore-
closure of competition in the TBA market."0 4 This was said to fol-
low from the "inherent leverage" resulting from the industry "mar-
ket structure." In what might be termed "psychological coercion,"
Judge Wisdom described the natural tendency of the dealers to
curry the goodwill of Shell in order to gain favors, and to avoid
possible punishment, real or imagined. "When he hears that Shell
will benefit from his patronage of sponsored TBA outlets, the velvet
glove of request has within it the mailed fist of command."05
In FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,90 the Supreme Court summarily va-
cated the court of appeals' decision (which had vacated the Com-
mission's opinion and order for lack of any finding of overt coercion)
and remanded for redetermination "in light of" its decision in At-
lantic. The Commission's petition for certiorari had alleged that
"Texaco has sufficient economic power over its wholesale and retail
petroleum distributors to cause them to purchase substantial amounts
of TBA even without the use of overt coercive tactics."0 7 This action
by the Court was taken by Judge Wisdom in Shell as further evi-
dence that overt coercion is not an essential element of a section 5
violation.98
The District of Colimbia Circuit, reconsidering Texaco, dis-
agreed.99 On remand, the Commission entered an order and filed
its opinion holding that the Texaco plan was indistinguishable in
fundamental operation and competitive effect from the one held
unlawful in Atlantic.10° On the second appeal to the District of
Columbia Circuit, the Commission again contended that the TBA
sales-commission is inherently unlawful without regard to evidence
94 Id. at 487.
95 Id.
96 381 U.S. 789 (1965).
97 Quoted in Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 1966).
98 Id.
99 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 383 F.2d 942, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. granted 390
U.S. 979 (1968).
100 B. F. Goodrich & The Texas Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TxtAw RGr.
REP. 17,424 (FTC 1965).
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of overt coercion. Judge Burger, for the court, agreed with the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Shell that Atlantic did not establish a per se
rule, and that it was based upon the three essential components out-
lined by Judge Wisdom.101 However, Judge Burger could "glean
nothing from the utterances of the Supreme Court which alters the
basic rule that a finding of coercion is the threshold requirement of
a determination of exercise of dominant economic power."' 02 In his
view, if the Court in Atlantic had meant to hold that the use of
"mere salesmanship without any coercion" was an unlawful exercise
of economic power, there would have been no reason to remand for
further consideration and the Court would have simply reversed the
initial appellate decision and reinstated the Commission's order. 08
Accordingly, he held that, in the absence of evidence or a Commis-
sion finding of overt coercion, the Texaco order and opinion should
again be set aside and remanded to the Commission with directions
to dismiss the complaint.10 4 The Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari, 0 5 and hopefully this crucial point of contention shall be
cleared up at last.
IV. UNILATERAL REsTRICTIvE DEALING PRACTICES
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Adoption of the economic leverage theory advocated by the
Commission in the TBA trilogy might have even broader implica-
tions under section 2 of the Sherman Act'0 6 than it does under
section 5 of the FTC Act. One of the perennial problems in re-
strictive dealing cases under Clayton Act section 3107 and Sherman
Act section 1108 has been the necessity for proving the existence
of a lease, sale or contract of sale (as required by the former) or a
contract, combination or conspiracy (as required by the latter). This
problem has been particularly acute in the area of unilateral re-
fusals to deal with anyone not adhering to a pre-announced restric-
tive dealing policy. Admitedly, inroads have been made on the scope
101 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 3883 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
102 Id. at 946.
103 Id. at 947.
104 Id. at 951.
105 390 U.S. 979 (1968).
106 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964):
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
107 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), text quoted at note 4 supra.
108 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), text quoted at note 7 supra.
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of the businessman's right to unilaterally select those with whom he
will deal. Thus, cooperative enforcement efforts, or acquiescence to
threats or other coercive acts may supply the circumstantial evidence
needed to imply an unlawful combination. 09 Where applicable, the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine provides another means of estab-
lishing the necessary concerted action." However, the basic anti-
trust doctrine, that one has a privilege to select those with whom he
will deal, established in the Supreme Court's 1919 decision in
United States v. Colgate & Co.,"' has yet to be overruled, leaving at
least a vestigial area for unilaterally implementing a restrictive deal-
ing policy outside the proscriptions of either Clayton Act section 3 or
Sherman Act section 1.112
Despite sparse authority, there is nothing new or novel in the
idea that monopolization or an attempt to monopolize in violation
of section 2 may result from the use of monopoly power in one
market to foreclose competition in another. The basic theory was
advanced by the Supreme Court twenty years ago in United States v.
Griffith."x3 The Department of Justice had attacked the practice of
affiliated motion picture exhibitors of executing "master agree-
ments" with film distributors covering films to be released during an
entire season. The agreements, executed to cover an entire circuit of
theatres, were said to have as their purpose and effect the acquisition
of certain exclusive privileges, including the preemption of film
selection and the receipt of "clearances" over competing theatres.
The vice of the master agreements was said to be the use of the
monopoly power of those theatres in the circuit which had a mo-
nopoly in their geographic market to foreclose competition in those
markets where there were competing theatres-the familiar exten-
sion-of-monopoly theory.
Justice Douglas, for the six-to-one majority, acknowledged that
large-scale buying is not per se unlawful." 4 However, he stated that
it may not be used to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize, or to
"stifle competition by denying competitors less favorably situated
109 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
110 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc, $40 U.S. 211 (1951); United
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (NJ). Ohio 1949), aff'd 341 U.S.
593 (1951).
ll 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
112 See, e.g., Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112
(4th Cir. 1967). cert. denied, 398 US. 1036 (1968).
"3 334 US. I00 (1948).
114 Id. at 108.
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access to the market." 1 r5 Indeed, at another point he cited Inter-
national Salt for the proposition that it is "unreasonable, Per se, to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market," concluding that
"the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a com-
petitor, is unlawful." 116 In language presaging the Commission's
TBA "inherently" illegal theory, Justice Douglas emphasized the
anticompetitive effects of the exhibitors' circuit-wide bargaining
practices, which he indicated necessarily results from the utilization
of economic leverage:
A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town com-
mands the entrance for all films into that area. If he uses that
strategic position to acquire exclusive privileges in a city where
he has competitors, he is employing his monopoly power as a
trade weapon against his competitiors.... Though he makes no
threat to withhold the business of his closed or monopoly towns
unless the distributors give him the exclusive film rights in the
towns where he has competitors, the effect is likely to be the same
where the two are joined. When the buying power of the entire
circuit is used to negotiate films for his competitive as well as
his closed towns, he is using monopoly power to expand his
empire. And even if we assume that a specific intent to accom-
plish that result is absent, he is chargeable in legal contempla-
tion with that purpose since the end result is the necessary and
direct consequence of what he did.11
This treatment of "buying leverage" in Griffith invites com-
parison with the movie block-booking cases."18 While the latter were
examples of selling leverage of a forward-vertical nature, Griffith's
restrictive effects were of a backward-vertical nature. As already
noted, each may involve the use of economic power in one market
as a lever to foreclose competition in another; i.e., each is a form of
"tying" in the broader sense. The significant difference between the
block-booking cases and Griffith is found in Justice Douglas' indica-
tion in the latter that a tying "agreement," express or implied, is not
necessary to violate Sherman Act section 2. Furthermore, as in the
Commission's quasi-tying theory, he would not require evidence of
threats or other overtly coercive tactics to find a violation because
bargaining from a position of power "to foreclose competition, to
115 Id.
216 Id. at 107.
117 Id. at 107-08 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
118 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is
unlawful."n 9
A more recent example of the use of the leverage theory under
Sherman Act section 2 is found in the pending complaint in United
States v. General Tire & Rubber Co.120 In addition to a count charg-
ing an intra-corporate conspiracy in violation of Sherman Act sec-
tion 1, the complaint charges a violation of section 2 by coercive and
persuasive reciprocal buying efforts in an attempt to monopolize
"substantial amounts" of interstate commerce. Pursuant to and in
effectuation of the alleged attempt to monopolize, the defendants
are alleged to have engaged in the following practices:
(a) established and maintained a Trade Relations Department
and trade relations program;
(b) took measures to insure that suppliers and potential sup-
pliers were aware of the defendants' Trade Relations De-
partment and its activities;
(c) directed their respective purchasing personnel to report their
purchases to General Tire's Trade Relations Department
and to observe requests and suggestions from said Depart-
ment concerning purchasing from particular suppliers and
potential suppliers;
(e) refused to buy from those suppliers who refuse to purchase
from the respective defendants.' 1
The effects of such practices allegedly were that actual and potential
suppliers have been foreclosed from selling "substantial quantities"
of materials and services to defendants, and that competitors of
defendants have been foreclosed from selling "substantial quantities"
of competing products and services to those having reciprocal ar-
rangements with defendants.
In addition to the fact that the General Tire complaint attacks
unilateral attempts at reciprocity of both the coercive and persuasive
variety, it is especially noteworthy in two other quasi-tying respects.
First, the thrust of the complaint is not directed at the use of
monopoly power or dominance in any defined relevant market, but
at the use of "buying power" derived from the fact that defendants
purchase "substantial quantities" of specified goods and services.
119 Id. at 107.
10 Civil No. 67155 (N.D. Ohio, filed March 2, 1967). The full complaint is re-
ported in 36 A.BA. ANmTusr L.J. 134 (1967), and in 295 A'rmusr & T~ar Fxc. RE'.
§ X-1 (March 7, 1967).
-21 United States v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 36 A.B.A. ANr-U rr UJ. 134,
139 (1967).
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Second, the adverse effect is stated in terms of competition foreclosed
in substantial quantities of such goods and services. In other words,
the quantitative substantiality test is invoked to show both sufficient
economic power, or leverage, in the tying interest (purchases) and an
adverse effect on a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the
tied interest (sales). And all of this without the need to establish an
agreement or combination, or detriment to the other party. The
gravamen of the section 2 count is (1) the communicated policy, (2)
implemented through the unilateral control of quantitatively sub-
stantial purchases, (3) resulting in a quantitatively substantial fore-
closure of competition with third parties. If successful, this would
be not only a substantial inroad on the Colgate doctrine but also a
significant step beyond the quantitative substantiality test of Inter-
national Salt and toward virtually per se treatment of reciprocal
dealing policies.
V. PER SE RULES VERSUS THE RULE OF REASON
A. The Problem
The value of certainty and simplicity in enforcement provided
by per se rules is immediately apparent. Less apparent is the proper
classification and labeling of the types of conduct to be included in
the per se category, and the identification of particular conduct as
fitting within one of those classes. Is it sufficient to say, as the Court
has, that the per se category is made up of "agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use"?12  What
constitutes the requisite "pernicious" competitive effect? How is that
distinguished from the resulting "precise harm"? What qualifies as a
"redeeming virtue" as opposed to a "business excuse"? Are the effect
and justification factors to be given equal weight? Is there to be any
inquiry in per se cases, short of an "elaborate inquiry" into the com-
petitive harm? How elaborate is "elaborate"?
Questions such as these suggest that the classification of any
particular type of conduct as per se unreasonable is going to require,
in the first instance, an inquiry into the nature, purposes and actual
or probable effects of the conduct. In other words the per se "rule"
is merely a special application of the Rule of Reason: Where it is
122 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 US. 1, 5 (1958).
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once determined that identifiable types of conduct always result in
unreasonable restraints of trade, they are properly classified as per se
unreasonable. Initially, this requires knowledge of "enough of the
economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge
to be certain."'2 3
Carrying this analysis further, the specified conduct, though
not in itself per se illegal, may be unreasonable under certain limited
conditions, in which case only those conditions need be established
to prove a violation. The quantitative substantiality and comparative
substantiality tests are examples of this "simplified" approach. The
fewer the conditions precedent the less extensive the inquiry neces-
sary to prove a violation; i.e., the burden of proof may be viewed as
a continuum ranging from per se unreasonable, through proof of
minimum conditions, to an extended economic inquiry-all being
within the general principle of the Rule of Reason. The problem
then is the predetermination of the nature and quality of proof
necessary to test the various identifiable categories of conduct, bear-
ing in mind the pitfalls of misclassifications and mislabeling.
Where the purpose or effect of a particular type of conduct is
solely to restrain trade, an extended Rule of Reason inquiry is mani-
festly inappropriate. But where the restraint is ancillary to a lawful
main purpose, it is necessary to balance the relative harm against the
benefit, or "redeeming virtue," to determine the net effect, or "rea-
sonableness," of the conduct. This process requires a determination
of (1) the legitimate interest to be served by the practice, (2) whether
the restraint is reasonably ancillary to, and no broader than necessary
to accomplish, that lawful main purpose, and (3) whether competi-
tion is not "unduly" restrained. This procedure, in turn, requires a
consideration of the purpose, power and effect of the conduct in
question.' 24
=23 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
124 In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898),
Judge Taft (later Chief Justice) recognized the doctrine of ancillary restraints in his
classic review of the common law authorities prior to the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court subsequently adopted the reasoning of Judge Taft in applying the Rule of
Reason to ancillary restraints of trade. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 US. 469, 498
(1940); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 US. 1, 51 (1911). For the historical
development of the Rule of Reason, see Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sher-
man Act, 15 A.B.A. A.rrrusr SacrioN 211 (1959). Cf. Turner, The Validity of
Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HLv. L. REv. 50 (1958). Where
less restrictive alternatives are available, Professor Turner would rule the ancillary
restraint not reasonably necessary to accomplish the lawful purpose, and therefore per
se unreasonable. Id. at 59. This extension of the "reasonably-ancillary" test has been
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B. Power and Effect
This review discloses a rather startling paradox regarding the
power and effect yardsticks in restrictive dealing practices: (1) Tying
(and quasi-tying) arrangements are likely to be less restrictive on
competition than exclusive dealing arrangements, but (2) tying is
treated as more nearly per se illegal than exclusive dealing.
The increasingly refined quantitative substantiality test, as
applied to tying and quasi-tying (including reciprocity), has reached
the point of virtually per se illegality. We have seen the Supreme
Court move from a requirement of monopoly power or dominance
in the tying interest to the inference of the requisite power from the
"uniqueness or consumer appeal" of the tying interest. Under the
latter test, Justice Black's "simple example" in Northern Pacific"
of a lawful attempt by one of a dozen food stores to tie the sale of
sugar to the sale of flour is not so simple after all. If the seller's tying
product, flour, is an exclusive or private brand with special consumer
appeal, or is made by a patented process, or is otherwise unique, the
requisite power may be inferred. Indeed, under the economic lever-
age test advanced by the Commission in the TBA cases, the flour
need not have any unique attributes or special appeal. Under this
quasi-tying test the requisite power may be inferred from the market
structure, or from the bargaining position of the seller vis-a-vis the
buyers. For example, if the customers were also "franchised" resellers,
employees, debtors, creditors, or dependent on the seller for recipro-
criticized on the ground that "it strips the rule of reason of any genuine content,"
inasmuch as "there will almost always be a less restrictive alternative, and Indccd,
further alternatives to each alternative ad infinitum." Handler, Some Misadventures in
Antitrust Policymaking-Nineteenth Annual Review, 76 YALE L.J. 92, 123-24 (1966).
Whatever the logic of the proposal, or its alleged fallacy, the courts have not yet shown
any inclination totally to discard the Rule of Reason as the pervasive antitrust test.
Professor Turner would go further, however, where the legitimate interest could not be
served by a less restrictive alternative, and ask "whether the contribution made by the
restrictive practice is likely to be outweighed by the harm, over the range of situations
in which it may be used." Turner, supra at 59. He would lump the justified and un-
justified ancillary restraints together on the ground that "A per se rule Is dearly
justified ... if the contributions to legitimate interests, though sacrificed by a per s
rule, are comparatively small." Id. Aside from the arbitrariness of this approach, an
obvious difficulty is the quantitative balancing of unlike desiderata. At a minimum It
requires a policy determination that the certainty and simplicity of the per se test
warrants sacrificing some other legitimate interests. Here again, this balancing of
interests requires a consideration of the purpose, power and effect of the conduct In
question.
125 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 856 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958). See text
accompanying note 16 supra.
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cal business, the fear of endangering the relationship or the hope of
currying favor may be sufficient as a psychological carrot-stick weapon
to secure the buyer's acquiescence in the proffered tie-in. Further-
more, under the Commission's quasi-tying theory, this may result
from the relationship alone, without any threats, promises, overt
coercion, agreement or understanding. The only question would be
whether the commerce affected, or likely to be affected, is "not in-
substantial."
The lower limits of quantitative substantiality remain unde-
termined.12 6 The Supreme Court has yet to uphold a tying arrange-
ment on the ground that the amount of commerce affected was in-
significant. In any event, the problem may have been effectively
mooted under the Court's Brown Shoe rationale that, under FTC
Act section 5, the Commission need not even meet the incipiency test
of Clayton Act section 3.127 As already noted, if similar reasoning
were adopted in an attempt-to-monopolize case under Sherman Act
section 2, the relegation of tying and quasi-tying to the per se cate-
gory would be complete, whether in an action by the Commission,
the Department of Justice, or a private plaintiff.
At least on its face, the Standard Stationsm' comparative sub-
stantiality test for exclusive dealing or requirements contracts appears
to approach more closely a qualitative appraisement of the actual or
probable effects. Furthermore, in judging exclusive dealing arrange-
ments the Court has not limited its inquiry to a simple determination
of the percentage market share affected.'m
This more qualitative approach to exclusive dealing has been
emphasized by the Court in measuring the competitive effects of
vertical mergers under Clayton Act section 7. In Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States'30 the Court noted, in measuring the effect of a vertical
acquisition, that the share of the market foreclosed was "an important
consideration," but that where "the foreclosure is neither of monop-
oly nor de minimis proportions, the percentage of the market fore-
dosed by the vertical arrangement cannot itself be decisive."' 3 ' In
cases between these obvious extremes, "it becomes necessary to under-
take an examination of various economic and historical factors" to
126 Cf. note 26 supra.
327 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
128 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 US. 293 (1949).
129 Id. at 309.
130 370 US. 294 (1962).
131 Id. at 329.
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test the probable competitive effects of the merger.182 These "eco-
nomic and historical factors" involve an examination of the particular
restraint in its competitive setting, including the industry structure,
its development and whether there is a trend in that industry toward
concentration133--such factors, in other words, as were considered in
Standard Stations in testing requirements contracts. The Court's
merger test is particularly relevant in light of the fact that it recog-
nized the virtually identical language and tests of illegality under
sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act. And, in emphasizing the inter-
dependence of the relative market foreclosure and the economic
purpose of the vertical arrangement, the Court restated the proposi-
tion that
if a particular vertical arrangement, considered under § 3,
appears to be a limited term exclusive-dealing contract, the
market foreclosure must generally be significantly greater than
if the arrangement is a tying contract before the arrangement
will be held to have violated the Act.184
The question remains: Why should tying receive harsher treat-
ment than exclusive dealing? It certainly is not because a "pernicious
effect" is more likely to result from tying than from exclusive dealing
-at least not if perniciousness is measured by the degree of the
probable foreclosure of competition. By definition a requirements
contract or exclusive-dealing arrangement requires the buyer to
refrain absolutely from dealing in competing products. On the other
hand, tying may or may not involve such total exclusivity. If the
particular tie-in required the purchase of all requirements in the
tied product it would amount to the same thing as a requirements
contract, with the already noted distinction that the "leverage," or
condition, is found in the power possessed in a different rather than
the same product. But tying does not necessarily, if even often, go
that far. Full-line forcing, block-booking, and package-licensing do
not have that absolutely exclusive effect in the tied products unless
the quantity required to get the "package" equals tile buyer's total
requirements. Theoretically, every supplier to Macy's or Gimbels'
could require each store to stock its full line of goods without in any
way foreclosing competition or raising entry barriers. Assuming the
department stores have the space and the capital to handle all lines
fully, not only would competition not be foreclosed but the increased
132 Id.
133 Id. at 332.
134 Id. at 329-30
[Vol. 29
RESTRICTIVE DEALING PRACTICES
availability of consumer products should actually result in increased
competition.
The one instance in which tying typically takes on the appear-
ance of a full requirements obligation is where the tied products are
used as inputs into tying machinery. But again a closer examination
reveals that, depending on the circumstances, something less than
total exclusivity or qualitatively substantial foreclosure may result.
Even where the tying machine constitutes a monopoly, conditioning
its lease on the exclusive use of the lessor's input supplies will not
necessarily have a substantial effect on competition in the tied
product, either comparatively or qualitatively. Of course, if the only
use for the tied product is as an input to the monopoly machine, the
effect would be to totally foreclose competition in the tied product.
But, if the tied product has other uses-i.e., if the line of commerce
is more broadly defined-the relative foreclosure of competition
would be less than complete, and possibly "insignificant" in qualita-
tive, if not quantitative, terms. An annual sale of 500,000 dollars in
salt, or anything else, has little competitive significance without
knowing the market's total annual sales, to say nothing of the "eco-
nomical and historical factors" of the competitive setting.
In the input tying case, if comparable machines are readily avail-
able at terms competitive with the tying machine, and if the lessee
can conveniently utilize the substitute machines, competition in the
tied product may be affected no more than in the full-line forcing
example. The lessee is free to use the tying lessor's machine exclu-
sively, not at all, or together with as many other competing machines
as he desires. Yet, the watered-down "uniqueness" test for judging
"power" in the tying product may make the contract illegal with a
bare showing that the amount of tied product affected was not
quantitatively insubstantial.
Although the subsequent trend toward today's per se attitude in
tying cases makes its precedent value more than a little dubious, the
Court's 1923 decision in FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co.235 provides an
excellent example of the importance of the particular factual setting
in judging the effects of tying. The Commission had instituted
separate proceedings under the FTC and Clayton Acts against some
thirty refiners and wholesalers of gasoline, condemning and ordering
them to cease the practice of selling, leasing or loaning gasoline
storage tanks and pumps to retail dealers at nominal prices upon the
condition that the equipment be used only with gasoline supplied by
135 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
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the lessor. After noting that the contract in Sinclair did not limit the
lessee's right to deal in competing goods, leaving him "free to follow
his own judgment," the Court went on to distinguish the circum-
stances of this arrangement from tie-ins which had been declared to
be unlawful:
Many competitors seek to sell excellent brands of gasoline and
no one of them is essential to the retail business. The lessee is
free to buy wherever he chooses; he may freely accept and use
as many pumps as he wishes and may discontinue any or all of
them. He may carry on business as his judgment dictates and his
means permit, save only that he cannot use the lessor's equip-
ment for dispensing another's brand. By investing a compara-
tively small sum, he can buy an outfit and use it without
hindrance. He can have respondent's gasoline, with the pump
or without the pump, and many competitors seek to supply his
needs. 3 6
The Court concluded that the record disclosed no "purpose or power
to acquire unlawful monopoly" and no probability of an unduly
anticompetitive effect. "Upon the contrary, it appears to have pro-
moted the public convenience by inducing many small dealers to
enter the business and put gasoline on sale at the crossroads." 187
With all that has transpired during the forty-five years since
Sinclair, it is understandable that it is generally mentioned today, if
at all, for its limited historical interest. However, this neglect or rele-
gation to the annals of ancient legal history is ill deserved. It is
pregnant with the underlying economic, social, and political and
antitrust implications of tying, and many of the most significant dis-
tinctions relevant to the effects of such practices are implicit in the
Court's qualitative approach. Among these is the recognition that
tying may affect competition (1) at either the buyer or seller level,
or both; and (2) in either the tying or tied product market, or both.
The primary focus of concern in tying has been the possible
foreclosure of existing and potential competitors from the tied prod-
uct market. This may result in one or both of two ways: (1) from the
leverage or economic power in the tying product; or (2) from the
combined power, or "conglomerate" leverage, in the "package" of
both the tying and tied products. The former involves the traditional
extension-of-monopoly theory as refined by the Loew's doctrine,
whereby the seller may have an advantage over competitors in the
tied product who have a less desirable tying product, or none at all.
:16 Id. at 474.
137 Id. at 475.
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Furthermore, even where the seller has no competitive advantage
over other diversified sellers-i.e., where the latter have an equally
acceptable tying product (as in Sinclair)-competition with non-
diversified competitors in the tied product may be affected. This is
the "collective foreclosure" effect emphasized in Standard Stations.
Assuming that the package tie-in is more attractive to the buyer than
separate acquisitions of the tying and tied products from different
sources, the single-line supplier of the tied product may be forced to
expand into the tying market to overcome the competitive advantage
of his diversified competitors. This in turn would further a trend
toward diversification, or "conglomerate bigness," such as that con-
demned in the merger cases.138 Thus, Sinclair is important for its
recognition that no adverse competitive effects are likely to result
from tying where there is no resulting competitive advantage, and
where competition flourishes in the sale of both the tying and tied
products by both diversified and single-line competitors.
A significant problem implicit in Sinclair, though not discussed,
is the use of tying as an indirect method of price cutting.139 The
tying equipment was leased to dealers on a nonprofit or a below-cost
basis, while the gasoline was sold at competitive prices. This had the
effect of indirectly lowering the price of gasoline tied to the equip-
ment lease. Thus, if Sinclair gained any advantage over competing
gasoline suppliers it was because of the indirect price reduction of
gasoline, rather than an inherent power or leverage in the tying
equipment. At most, this type of arrangement would amount to a
gasoline requirements contract, but not tying in the usual sense. And
where, as the Court found in Sinclair, the dealer is not bound to deal
exclusively in the seller's gasoline, and may practicably purchase and
resell competing brands as well, or switch at will, the requirements
label would also be inappropriate. Under these conditions, the effect
would be the introduction of some indirect price competition into
the sale of gasoline-a result seemingly consistent with antitrust
policy. This competition may be met by other gasoline marketers in
kind, either by similar equipment offers to dealers or by direct cuts
138 E.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); see Day, Conglomerate Mergers and "The Curse
of Bigness," 42 N.C.L. REv. 511 (1964).
139 See Turner, supra note 124, at 65. Combination sales, "bonus" offers, "free"
gifts, premiums and the like have become a common method of sales promotion. The
prime point of concern has been whether a particular practice is false or misleading
in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. See G. ALEXANDER, HoNESTY AND COMPETMON
138-52 (1967).
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in gasoline prices, thereby enabling the dealers to acquire the equip.
ment on their own with the resultant savings in the lower cost of
gasoline. In other words, in a Sinclair situation the competing sup-
pliers of the tied product may have to meet competition by cutting
their prices, either directly or indirectly, but need not diversify if
they are unable or unwilling to do so.
The difficulty in this analysis of promotional tying-the "free
gift" forthcoming only on the purchase of another (tied) product-
is its disregard for the possible effect on competition with the non-
diversified suppliers of the tying product, and the secondary, long.
run effect it may have on non-diversified sellers of the tied product.
For example, consider the independent suppliers of gasoline storage
and handling equipment in Sinclair. Again, the effect on competi-
tion will vary according to the circumstances. Suppose that all of the
major oil companies diversify into the production of the equipment
themselves (or "sponsor" equipment made by another, as in the
TBA cases). Even though competition between them is unaffected,
and the dealers benefit from the non-price competition, the inde-
pendent equipment suppliers may be forced to either diversify into
gasoline to meet the competition or go out of the equipment business.
In turn, this would eliminate the independent source of equipment,
forcing the non-diversified oil companies to either diversify to meet
the competition of those already diversified or go out of business. In
either event, the trend to economic concentration, or "conglomerate
bigness," would be furthered.
On the other hand, suppose that the equipment subject to the
promotional tying was purchased from the equipment manufacturers
for redistribution by the oil companies. Rather than selling directly
to the dealers, the equipment suppliers would merely be competing
for sales to the oil companies with minimal, if any, likely effect on
competition in the sale of equipment. 140 Indeed, the ability to sell in
larger quantities to the oil companies may give rise to cost savings
which, if passed on, might further benefit the dealers and, ultimately,
the public. Finally, the continuation of the independent equipment
suppliers would enable non-diversified oil companies to meet the
non-price competition of its competitors either (1) with similar pro-
motional tying or (2) with direct price cuts, permitting dealers to
acquire their own equipment from the independent suppliers.
Another factor relevant to the determination of the probable




competitive effect of tying is the object of the restriction-whether
it is the ultimate consumer or a middleman purchasing for resale.
In Sinclair, where the restriction was on the dealers, the Court noted
that competing suppliers were not limited in their choice of outlets
to the ultimate consumer. Neither was the consuming public re-
stricted in its choice of brands, as exemplified in the Court's finding
that the effect of the arrangements had been to encourage competi-
tion between independent dealers "at the crossroads."' 4' In the
middleman tie-ins, the controlling question would be whether ade-
quate alternative outlets are readily available at equal cost and con-
venience, so that competition for sales to the ultimate consumer by
actual and potential competitors is not impaired. On the other hand,
there is no way around tying restrictions on the consumer-if con-
sumers are tied up, the availability of alternative outlets is im-
material.14'
At the buyer level the usual concern with tying is said to be
its coercive effect in limiting the customer's freedom of choice in
suppliers. However, the fact that the buyer willingly agrees to the
restriction, whether because he is indifferent, unaffected, or even
benefited, is not controlling. For example, a competitive-terms clause
permitting the purchase of a competitor's tied product where it was
available under more favorable terms would not excuse the tie-in
from the virtual per se treatment, 43 on the theory that, all other
things being equal, the tying seller still has a competitive advantage
at the same price. Similarly, mutual patronage, under the General
Dynamics'4 view, would be unlawful even though both parties to
the reciprocal restrictions favor the arrangement. In other words, the
foreclosure of competitors is the real consideration, and the restric-
tion on the buyer's freedom of choice is only secondary, or make-
weight. In requirements contracts, however, Tampa Electric would
consider whether the restrictive dealing arrangement benefited the
buyer as well as the seller, at least where a substantial share of the
141 261 U.S. at 475.
142 See International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936).
Noting that tying IBM tabulating cards to the lease of IBM tabulating machines "pre-
cludes the use of the cards of any competitor," the Court distinguished Sinclair on the
ground that "as the only use made of the gasoline was to sell it, and as there was no
restraint upon the purchase and sale of competing gasoline, there was no violation of
the Clayton Act." Cf. Turner, supra note 124, at 72-73.
143 Northern Padfic Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 US. 1 (1958); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
144 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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market is not foreclosed and there is no trend to concentration. The
latter view, placing greater emphasis on the purpose, or "redeeming
virtue," of requirements contracts benefiting the buyer, illustrates
the interdependence of the power, purpose and effects elements in
restrictive dealing practices generally.
C. Purpose-Redeeming Virtue or Business Excuse
As already noted, under the Rule of Reason a lawful main pur-
pose must be established to justify an ancillary restraint, but such
lawful purpose will not save an "unreasonable" restraint of trade,
even where ancillary to the accomplishment of that purpose.145 In
other words, "purpose" is a negative element-it may support a find
ing of illegality but, by itself, will not support a finding of legality.
For example, the requirements contract in Tampa Electric was found
to be for the lawful purpose of insuring to the public utility a suf-
ficient supply of coal. But this purpose alone would not be enough
to justify the restraint. As noted in the Court's Brown Shoe merger
decision (citing Tampa Electric), a requirements contract "may es-
cape censure" if, in addition to this lawful purpose, "only a small
share of the market is involved ... and if there is no trend toward
concentration in the industry."'146
The consequences of this interdependence of purpose and effect
have already been demonstrated. It has been seen that promotional
tying may have the redeeming virtue of introducing indirect price
competition but, depending upon the circumstances, it may also have
anticompetitive effects which would serve to reduce it to an unjusti-
145 See note 124 supra. A concise restatement of this theory of ancillary restraints
is found in United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178 (S.D.N.Y.
1960):
The doctrine of ancillary restraint . . . permits, as reasonable, a restraint
which (1) is reasonably necessary to the legitimate primary purpose of the
arrangement, and of no broader scope than reasonably necessary; (2) does not
unreasonably affect competition in the marketplace; and (3) is not imposed
by a party or parties with monopoly power.
140 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330-31. A recent illustration of
the Court's emphasis of the interdependence of purpose and effect is found in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967):
Our inquiry is whether, assuming nonpredatory motives and business pur-
poses and the incentive of profit and volume considerations, the effect upon
competition in the marketplace is substantially adverse. The promotion of
self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of reason to immunize otherwise
illegal conduct. It is only if the conduct is not unlawful in its impact in the
marketplace or if the self-interest coincides with the statutory concern with the
preservation and promotion of competition that protection is achieved.
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fiable business excuse. The genesis of the tying cases--i.e., tying
input supplies to patented machines-still has its tenacious defenders
who assert that the practice may be justified on the ground that it
provides a legitimate means of economic price discrimination. Ac-
cording to the more or less abstract theories advanced in its support,
it would permit the tying seller to maximize his profits while more
fairly charging for the intensity of use (or need) of the tying machine
according to the amount of tied input supplies utilized in the pro-
cess.147 But the argument that this use of tying as a "metering" de-
vice may benefit the buyer (particularly the small user) as well as the
seller ignores the fact that competing sellers would thereby be fore-
dosed from the tied product market, contrary to judicial policy.'"
A common defense to a charge of unlawful tying is that it is
essential to protect goodwill in the tying interest. Where the two
products are complementary, the use of an inferior tied product may
result in customer dissatisfaction with the combination, with some
or all of the fault being attributed to the tying product. The usual
judicial response has been that normally there are less restrictive
alternatives available to accomplish this purpose, such as requiring
that complementary products, from whatever source, meet reason-
ably necessary standards or specifications, or warning that the use
of inferior complementary products may produce unsatisfactory re-
sults. 49 Here again the need or justification for using the tying re-
striction and the effectiveness of the less restrictive alternative will
depend upon the circumstances-in particular, whether the tying
restriction operates directly upon the ultimate consumer or upon a
middleman selling to the ultimate consumer.
Where a manufacturer sells through a middleman there is in-
147 See, e-g., Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Niw. U.L.
Rzv. 281,290 (1956); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YA=
L.J. 19 (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. Itm,. 62 (1960);
Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw &
CoNTEm'. PRoB. 552 (1965); Baldwin & MacFarland, Some Observations on "Per S"
and Tying Arrangements, 6 ANr'usr Bur.. 433 (1961); Baldwin & McFarland, Tying
Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 ANIR~usr BuuL. 743 (1963); E. SINmE, Awn-
tRusT EcoNomcs 177-86, 189-95 (1968).
148 See Turner, supra note 124, at 63 n.42; Adams, The Legality of Compulsory
Package Licensing of Patents, 12 AN'rrRusr Bu.. 773, 790-91 (1967). Again, the diffi-
culty with applying the judicial extension-of-monopoly theory to this situation is that
the amount of commerce foreclosed in the tied product may be minuscule. See Burstein,
supra note 148, at 63-64.
149 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397 (1947); Inter-
national Business Math. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936).
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creased likelihood that the ultimate consumer will not receive suf-
ficient warning that the complementary goods must meet certain
specifications in order to function properly. The transfereAce of
blame to the manufacturer's product, and the resultant loss of good-
will, is especially likely where the complementary products are sup-
plied by the same dealer. In that case, even if the manufacturer's
written warning is communicated to the ultimate purchaser, he may
disregard it on the assurance of a dealer who is more interested in
a sale than in the protection of the manufacturer's goodwill, or he
may mistakenly assume that the complementary products supplied
by the dealer meet the manufacturer's specifications, This problem
was recognized in Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp.,1 0 where
the Seventh Circuit upheld a requirement that Chevrolet dealers
"not sell, offer for sale, or use in the repair of Chevrolet motor ve-
hides and chassis, second-hand or used parts or any part or parts not
manufactured by or authorized by the Chevrolet Motor Com-
pany. . . "151 Each new Chevrolet carried a limited-time warranty
against defects in materials and workmanship which was inapplicable
where the car was repaired or altered in a way that, in the manufac-
turer's judgment, affected its reliability. In upholding the goodwill
defense to a Clayton Act section 3 charge, the court stated:
In the minds of the owners, the cars are identified and associ-
ated with the manufacturer. If defective or inefficient repairs or
replacements should be made, and the cars, as a result, should
operate unsatisfactorily, the owners' recollections will naturally
and inevitably revert to the specific name and manufacturer
thereof. Defective parts, preventing efficient operation of cars,
bring dissatisfaction with the automobiles themselves. The nat-
ural result is blame of the manufacturer and consequent loss of
sales.152
Even where a manufacturer sells directly to the ultimate con-
sumer, tying may be necessary if the manufacturer is unable to con-
vince the purchaser how important it is that complementary prod-
ucts meet his specifications. This problem arose in Dehydrating
Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp.,15s where the First Circuit upheld
defendant's refusal to sell its patented silo unloading device unless
the purchaser also used his patented glass-lined silo. Defendant had
previously sold the unloader separately to thirty-six customers. Of
150 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936).
151 Id. at 642.
152 Id. at 643.
153 g92 F, d 653 (Ist Cir. 1961).
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these thirty-six customers, eighteen complained that it did not work
properly where not used with defendant's silo, and six unloaders
were returned.'1 In the face of this actual loss of goodwill and of
defendant's inability to convince customers of the need to install
the unloaders in silos meeting its specifications, the tying restrictions
were held to be sufficiently reasonable, in the absence of rebuttal evi-
dence, to uphold a directed verdict for defendant.
A similar goodwill problem was involved in United States v.
Jerrold Electronics Corp. 55 The court there recognized that defen-
dants were initially "confronted with a rather unique situation" in
the development and sale of television equipment for community
TV antenna systems. 56 The court emphasized the fact that defen-
dant was engaged in the "launching of a new business with an un-
certain future," and that during the development period the nature
of the complicated equipment required responsible installation and
servicing of sensitive equipment, all of which justified Jerrold in
selling the components only as a single system and requiring the
purchaser to secure servicing exclusively from it. a15
Several difficulties attend the attempt to justify tying on the
ground that it is essential to protect goodwill in a new product, an
infant industry, or generally because no other source of supply is
available for complementary products meeting necessary specifica-
tions or standards. One problem arises where conditions change and
alternative sources of supply meeting the necessary standards become
available. In that event, it may be expected that the tie would no
longer be justified, and would thereafter be illegal. For example,
at some unspecified point before the trial in Jerrold Electronics the
industry was said to have matured sufficiently to no longer warrant
the tying practices; they were therefore declared to have become
unlawful. 58 Another difficulty is that the very existence of the tie
might discourage potential suppliers from attempting to enter the
industry or to develop a product meeting the necessary specifica-
tions. These considerations, together with the difficulties of deter-
mining whether any other supplier can, or possibly could, meet the
necessary specifications, suggest that it may be safer for the seller
to frame the restrictions in terms of specifications or standards rather
154 Id. at 656.
'55 187 F. Supp. 545 (EfD. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
156 Id. at 556.
157 Id. at 556-57.
'58 Id. at 558. The court held that defendant had the burden of establishing at
what point in time the restrictive dealing policy "was no longer justified." Id.
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than tying. Where policing presents an unreasonable burden, the
seller should be permitted to retain the right to determine which
of the alternative sources meet the reasonably necessary specifica-
tions-provided, of course, that this determination is made objec-
tively and in good faith.
One final situation in which tying may be the only means
available for the protection of goodwill is where it is not practicable
to prescribe specifications to insure that complementary products
function properly with the tying product. Indeed, according to the
Court's dictum in Standard Stations, "the only situation . . . in
which the protection of goodwill may necessitate the use of tying
clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so detailed
that they could not practicably be supplied."'510 A recent application
of this rationale is found in the Carvel litigation. The Second Cir-
cuit, by a split decision in Susser v. Carvel Corp.,1'0 upheld a require-
ment that a franchised soft ice cream dealer purchase his ice cream
mix, cones and other supplies from the trademark franchisor or from
a source approved by him. Noting that controls are necessary to
assure the goodwill of the licensed trademark,"" the majority con-
cluded that it is difficult to control "something so insusceptible of
precise verbalization as the desired texture and taste of an ice cream
cone or sundae.' ' 62 This reasoning was subsequently endorsed by
the Commision in its section 5 proceedings challenging the Carvel
franchise restrictions.6 3 According to the Commission, "[Q]uality
might be achievable by specifications whereas uniformity in all prob-
ability could not be.'1 4
Although the Second Circuit and the Commission agreed on
the "practicability" test, their views differed regarding the nature
of the Carvel franchise arrangements. When read together, these
decisions suggest that some significant trademark problems may arise
where a trademark owner attempts to exercise control over the use
of his trademark on goods emanating from a licensee or franchisee,
as distinguished from restrictive dealing limitations on a purchaser
of his trademarked products. While the usual goodwill arguments
159 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).
160 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S.
125 (1965).
161 Id. at 519.
162 Id. at 520.
168 Carvel Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TaAv Ra,. REP. 1 17,298 (FTC
1965).
104 Id. at p. 22,428.
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already discussed would apply whenever complementary goods are
tied to the sale of trademarked products, the law has been some-
what confused by the interaction of trademark and antitrust prin-
ciples where a trademark is licensed for use on goods originating
with the licensee.
A threshold question raised by these decisions is whether li-
censing the use of-a trademark conceptually can constitute a tying
product. The three-judge court held that it could, while the Com-
mission took the position that it could not. According to Judge
Friendly, joined by Judge Medina, the Carvel trademark was the
"true tying item."'1 5 Judge Lumbard agreed that the commissary
supplies were "separate products"' 16 tied to the "lease or license of
the trademark itself" but added that he felt this leverage was "but-
tressed by... [an] ... array of patents and subsidiary trademarks."'I6
The Commission disagreed. Commissioner Jones for the Commis-
sion stated that "the trademark license conceptually cannot consti-
tute a 'tying' product and, even if it could, it could never be regarded
as a separable 'product' apart from the mix and commissary items
to which it is attached within the meaning of the typical tie-in ar-
rangement."168
A basic issue thus confronted in Carvel is the nature and func-
tion of trademarks. Under the orthodox view, trademarks indicate
the source (even though anonymous) of the product or service to
which they relate. Theoretically, the trademark owner's self-interest
will motivate him to provide a product or service which has a uni-
formly high quality in order to encourage repeat sales and establish
consumer preference over the long run. By contrast, an infringer's
interest may be strictly short run-to misappropriate the trademark's
goodwill by taking a "free ride" for so long as it lasts. It is against
this risk of injury through deception that the trademark owner and
the public is protected, without requiring the additional burden of
proving in each case actual diversion of trade, injury to the trade-
mark owner's reputation, or economic detriment to the deceived
purchaser.
This "source" doctrine raises the question whether trademark
licensing would be deceptive, and therefore prohibited, whenever
the trademark is used with goods or services emanating from one
165 332 F.2d at 519.
166 Id. at 514.
167 Id. at 513.
168 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] Truna Rro. Rn'. at p. 22,425.
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or more sources (e.g., licensees) other than the trademark owner.
This conclusion finds support in the common law principle that
the right to use a trademark "cannot be transferred in gross."' 0 Ac-
cording to this view, as expressed in the Restatement, Torts:
A right to the use of a trade-mark or trade name can be
transferred along with a subject matter with which the trade-
mark or trade name is associated, if that subject matter is itself
transferable.170
A similar approach is taken in section 10 of the Lanham Act,
permitting the assignment of a trademark "with the goodwill of the
business in which the mark is used, or with that part of the good-
will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by
the mark .... ,"171 Further support for the "source" doctrine is found
in the Act's definition of "abandonment," which provides that a
trademark is deemed to be abandoned "when any course of conduct
of the registrant, including acts of omission as well as commission,
causes the mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin."'1 2
It could be argued that, under a strict application of the source
theory, trademark law requires that the licensor exact an exclusive-
dealing restriction on the ingredients used in the manufacture or
further processing of products bearing his trademark. At a mini-
mum, licensing might be permitted under this view only where the
trademark licensor "so actively participated in the preparation of
the final product through the supply of an essential ingredient or
service that consumer attribution of the origin to the licensor was
reasonably accurate."'' 73 Furthermore, this trademark principle would
not conflict with antitrust proscriptions of tying and exclusive deal-
ing because, as noted by the Commission in Carvel, conceptually
the trademark license is inseparable from the "product" to which
it relates-i.e., soft ice cream. 1'7 4 However, the Commission's deci-
sion in Carvel did not rest on the "source" doctrine. Instead, the
franchise restrictions were upheld on the more recent "control"
theory of trademark licensing.
This major challenge to the orthodox "source" theory is founded
169 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 755 (1938).
170 Id. § 756.
171 Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1964).
172 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964) (emphasis added).
173 Comment, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing,
72 YALE LJ. 1171, 1177 (1963).




in the belief that the consumer views trademarks as symbols of
quality rather than of origin. It is argued that the trademark owner
should be permitted to license others to use his trademark on their
goods or services, provided the licensor retains control over their
quality, just as he may sell under his own trademark products sup-
plied by others to his specifications. This quality control theory
underlies that interpretation of the Lanham Act which finds au-
thority in section 5 for licensing federally registered trademarks for
use on products or services emanating from the licensees. That sec-
tion, governing the use of a registered trademark by "related com-
panies," provides:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is
or may be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall
inure to the benefit of the registrant or applicant for registra-
tion, and such use shall not affect the validity of such mark or
of its registration, provided such mark is not used in such
manner as to deceive the public. 1 75
A "related company" is defined in the Act as one which "legitimately
controls or is controlled . . in respect to the nature and quality
of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used."'176
From this it is concluded that trademark licensing is permissible
under the Lanham Act, provided the licensor and licensees meet the
definition of "related companies," i.e., that the licensor retains the
requisite control over the nature and quality of the licensee's goods
and services.
In principle, the Commission in Caroel combined the "control"
theory with the "source" doctrine in concluding that
since no property right inheres in a trademark apart from the
product or service to which it relates [source doctrine], and since
trademarks may be licensed but only on condition that the trade-
mark owner retains control over the licensee's use of the trade-
mark [control doctrine], it is conceptually impossible, in our
opinion, to view a license to use a trademark as separate and
distinct from the sale of the trademarked product or its ingre-
dient.j77
In application, however, the Commission followed the control doc-
trine in reversing the hearing examiner's conclusion "that the re-
strictions imposed on Carvel's licensees were not reasonably related
175 Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1964).
176 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964) (emphasis added).
177 Carvel Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TaRE REG. RE'. 1 17,298 at 22,426
(FTC 1965).
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
to Carvel's right- and obligation-to control the quality of its trade-
mark product and the identity and image of its trade name." 178
As the Carvel litigation demonstrates, the control theory pre-
sents a trademark situation closely akin to the antitrust goodwill
defense. Under their theory "tying" may be permitted (or required)
to maintain uniformity and quality (goodwill) "where specifications
for a substitute would be so detailed that they could not practicably
be supplied."1 79 This similitude is underscored in the Commission's
finding that the "same problems of uniformity of quality and ease
of administration" were not present with respect to such standard-
ized items as toppings, nuts and cones.180 As to these, however, the
record evidence did not disclose the amount of commerce involved
and it was concluded that the foreclosure from including such items
in the franchise restrictions was "in all likelihood so de minimis in
view of Carvel's share of the purchasing market for these items,
which is probably less than one-tenth of one percent, that an order
prohibiting such a restriction is unwarranted."'81
Perhaps the most interesting problem touched upon in the
Carvel litigation concerned the antitrust consequences of licensing
the use of a mark as a trade name. The court and the Commission
agreed that prohibiting the sale of non-Carvel products by the spe-
cially designed outlets displaying the Carrel name was reasonably
ancillary to the protection of goodwill and the trademark "image."
Both tribunals relied on the control theory to support their con-
clusions. According to the Commission, such products "would be
attributed to that [Carvel] name, and any defects in quality, over
which Carvel would have no control, would detract from its name
and goodwill."' 82 Expanding on the same theme, the Second Circuit
stated:
The requirement that only Carvel products be sold at Carvel
outlets derives from the desirability that the public identify each
Carvel outlet as one of a chain which offers identical products
at a uniform standard of quality. The antitrust laws certainly
do not require that the licensor of a trademark permit his li-
censees to associate with that trademark other products unrelated
to those customarily sold under the mark. it is in the public
interest that products sold under one particular trademark be
subject to the control of the trademark owner. Carrel was not
178 Id. at p. 22,427.
179 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).
180 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. R,. at p. 22,428.
181 Id.
182 Id. at p. 22,431.
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required to accede to the requests of one or another of the
dealers that they be permitted to sell Christmas trees or ham-
burgers, for example, which would have thrust upon Carvel the
obligation to acquaint itself with the production and sale of
these items so as to establish reasonable quality controls.183
The logical extension of this justification for trademark/trade
name franchising brings us full cycle to where we began. Whether
considered a "right" or an "obligation," the control necessary to
prevent confusion of origin and to insure uniformity and quality
-the preservation of goodwill and trademark image-may be said
to require the franchisee to limit his dealings to those trademarked
products of his licensor, under whose trade name he conducts his
business. This legitimate purpose remains the same whether the
franchise is one for Standard Oil products, Brown shoes, Atlantic
sponsored TBA, or Carvel soft ice cream. The question remains:
when and under what circumstances will this purpose be considered
to be merely an unacceptable "business excuse" for unlawful tying,
quasi-tying, or exclusive dealing; and when and under what circum-
stances will it be considered to be a "redeeming virtue," or legiti-
mate "franchising"?
Each of these examples of tying defenses leads to the conclusion
that, unless it can be affirmatively demonstrated both that restrictive
dealing is essential to the promotion or sale of a commodity or ser-
vice and that the ancillary restraint has the net effect of enhancing
competition, the restriction will be unlawful if the proscribed degree
of foreclosure results. In each of the illustrations in which the de-
fense was successful, the restriction was shown to be essential for the
preservation of goodwill and, therefore, of the very existence of the
business-if the restriction were prohibited, the business would likely
suffer irreparable harm, and consequently would be an ineffective
competitor if able to survive at all.
This "survival" limitation on tying defenses is consistent with
the Court's assertion in the Brown Shoe merger decision that "unless
the tying device is employed by a small company in an attempt to
break into a market, the use of a tying device can rarely be har-
monized with the strictures of the antitrust laws,"'84 and with the
Court's recognition that integration may be justified where essential
to a small company for it to compete with larger competitors dom -
inating the market, or to save a failing company from going under.155
183 Sussex v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1964) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
384 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 350 (1962) (citation omitted).
185 Id. at 331.
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Beyond these limited "survival" defenses, the cases hold out little
hope of successfully justifying an otherwise unlawful restrictive deal-
ing practice.
The survival defenses are themselves, at the same time, delusive
and illusive. In the first place, proof that tying is necessary for sur-
vival may be difficult or impossible. The problems of the "failing
company" defense in merger cases have been well aired.180 When is
a company failing? When it is on the verge of bankruptcy? When
it is losing money? When its market share is declining? Assuming
the proper criteria for "failing" are determined and met, there still
remains the question: Is restrictive dealing necessary to save it? This
involves the problem of the availability of more reasonable alterna-
tives. For example, what if a business loan would enable the com-
pany to get back on its competitive feet? Or what if new manage-
ment, or other less restrictive promotional activities such as increased
advertising, would save it? Similar problems attend the "against
giants" and "new entry" defenses. Finally, as already noted, if the
survival defense is established there remains the problem of how
long the restrictive-dealing arrangement may be continued. Once
established, the justification may evaporate when the company ceases
to be failing, the competitive disadvantage of a small company in a
market of giants is overcome, or the new entry, new product, or new
industry becomes established. The point in time when the defense
ceases to exist may present a problem of proof at least as evasive
as the initial establishment of the "survival" defense.18 7
VI. CONCLUSION
This meandering review of restrictive dealing practices ends
about where it began. The legal status of exclusive dealing, tying
and quasi-tying (including reciprocity) remains in doubt. The ap-
plicable standards of legality have been blurred by judicial preoc-
cupation with labels, blind adherence to unanalyzed precedent (and
dicta), and a general reluctance to recognize distinctions, as well as
similarities, in the nature, purposes and effects of various restrictive
dealing practices in the context of the particular competitive setting.
186 See, e.g., discussion and references in Dean Foods Co., (1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,765 at 23,106-15 (FTC 1966); cf. id. at 23,122-24 (dissent-
ing opinion). See also Hearings on S. 1312 [the "Failing Newspaper" bill] Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1968).
187 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 558 (E.D. Pa.
1960), affd per curiam, 365 US. 567 (1961).
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The difficulty in evolving informative guidelines for general appli-
cation has been complicated by the inherent cumbersomeness of
the common-law, case-by-case development of antitrust principles.
As recognized by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., in antitrust law, "it is delusive to treat opinions
written by different judges at different times as pieces of a jig-saw
puzzle which can be, by effort, fitted correctly into a single pat-
tern.""' However, as Judge Wyzanski further noted, trends in judi-
cial thinking may be discerned from a line of decisions.
The key to understanding, if not harmonizing, the decisions
on restrictive dealing practices lies in identifying the basic antitrust
policy of the Supreme Court. The Court's trend toward per se treat-
ment of restrictive dealing practices may be recognized as merely
symptomatic of a more fundamental shift in antitrust goals from
the preservation of "effective" or "workable" competition, with its
emphasis on market performance and proscriptions of "undue" re-
straints, to the protection of small-business competitors, with its em-
phasis on the preservation of a decentralized, fragmented, market
structure and the curbing of incipient trends to economic concen-
tration, oligopoly, or "bigness." Thus, even where a requirements
contract is for the lawful purpose of insuring the customer a suf-
ficient supply or of providing the seller with a predictable market
for his output, it "may escape censure if only a small share of the
market is involved. .. and if there is no trend toward concentration
in the industry."' 18 9 Similarly, the only defenses recognized for tying
are those necessary for survival or for the enhancement of competi-
tion by small or relatively impotent competitors-such as where it
is essential to establish a new product or industry, to salvage a fail-
ing company, or to enable small competitors to compete against
giants in the industry.
This policy shift to an "anti-bigness" theme runs like a litany
through the Court's recent decisions relating to vertical restraints,
including mergers, territorial restrictions and price discrimination
as well as restrictive dealing practices. The liturgy has been the
equation of competition to numbers-a reversion to the classical
model of "pure" or "perfect" competition based on the theory that
"competition is likely to be greatest when there are many sellers,
none of which has any significant market share."'110 Corollary to this
188 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 US. 521 (1954).
189 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294. 330-31 (1962).
190 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 US. 321, 363 (1963).
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small-business thesis is the disdain for any arrangement which would
give anyone a competitive advantage, or would infringe on the small-
businessman's autonomy.
Paradoxically, the Court's aspirations of maintaining a frag-
mented, small-business, industry structure may result in a double
standard which is anti-bigness on its face, but anti-small-business in
operation. Tying and exclusive dealing contracts may be virtually
per se illegal for substantial companies, while apparently open to
the survival justification for disproportionately small, unestablished,
or failing companies. Although this double standard simplifies the
test for restrictive dealing arrangements by "big" companies, it leaves
open the question of when a company is sufficiently small or failing
to justify such arrangements. Neither the quantitative substantiality
test nor the comparative substantiality test provides much encour-
agement that the defense will be liberally applied. The sparse
decisions in this area lend even less hope that the promise of the
defense is much more than an illusion. In operation, the limited
defense may excuse restrictive dealing arrangements only in rare
cases under exceptional conditions, and only so long as the excep-
tional conditions continue to exist. The remainder, including ar-
rangements involving only relatively "small" companies, stand in
the shadow of the Court's "almost" per se illegal test.
It is in the area of alternatives available to "large" businesses,
as opposed to "small" businesses, that the anti-smallness effect be-
comes most obvious. The more restrictive nature of the alternatives
available to the large marketers was the basis for Justice Douglas'
dissent in Standard Stations, wherein he saw the majority's opinion
as promising to "wipe out large segments of independent filling-
station operators."'191 He felt that the requirements contract method
of doing business at least permitted the independent retailers to
remain alive as "small business units," and that its elimination would
promote further concentration in the major oil companies:
The formula suggested by the Court is either the use of the
"agency" device, which in practical effect means control of filling
stations by the oil companies, or the outright acquisition of them
by subsidiary corporations or otherwise. Under the approvedjudicial doctrine either of those devices means increasing the
monopoly of the oil companies over the retail field.192
Justice Douglas concluded that "the requirements contract which
191 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
102 Id. at 320 (citations omitted).
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is displaced is relatively innocuous as compared with the virulent
growth of monopoly power which the Court encourages."1 03
The Court's subsequent shift in merger policy under amended
Clayton Act section 7, and its retreat from the earlier per se legal
treatment of agency/consignment arrangements, has alleviated to
some degree Justice Douglas' fears of encouraging the "curse of big-
ness." However, vertical mergers have not been held to be illegal
per se, and agency/consignment arrangements are still tested by the
Rule of Reason.194 Furthermore, a restrictive dealing policy may be
implemented by unilateral action, either by customer selection on
the basis of a pre-announced policy or through internal expansion
vertically into a different level of the distribution chain. Absent
monopolization, or an attempt to monopolize, each of these latter
methods of vertical integration may be employed with apparent anti-
trust impunity.
Taken together, the current antitrust treatment of restrictive
dealing practices condemns as more nearly per se illegal those ar-
rangements which are most accessible to smaller businesses, while per-
mitting those methods of achieving the same goals which are func-
tionally available only to larger competitors. Vertical integration
through internal expansion may be beyond the reach of smaller
companies with limited financial, technical and management re-
sources. Similarly, the agency/consignment device minimally requires
the capital necesary to maintain the inventory to which title is re-
tained. To be an effective enforcement method, a unilateral refusal
to deal requires sufficient preference for the tying product, i.e., suf-
ficient "power," to induce acquiescence in the policy by indepen-
dent purchasers. Thus, vertical integration by contract remains the
only feasible method of restrictive dealing by smaller companies
with limited resources and insufficient power or leverage.
This discrepancy in treatment of those restrictive dealing prac-
tices available to "big" as opposed to "small" businesses could be
alleviated by reconciling the antitrust standards applicable to each.
One solution would be to condemn the "big" business methods of
achieving restrictive dealing objectives through unilateral refusals
to deal, agency/consignment arrangements, and internal vertical ex-
pansion on the same basis as integration by contract. To completely
eliminate their competitive advantage, existing "big" integrated com-
panies would have to be broken up to meet the Populist ideal of
193 Id. at 321.
19& United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 US. 365, 380-82 (1967).
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an egalitarian market structure. Obviously, a more practical and
politically more likely solution would be to discard the virtually
per se illegal treatment afforded vertical integration by contract in
favor of the more flexible qualitative principles of the Rule of Rea-
son ancillary restraint doctrine. However, the latter approach raises
the perennial dilemma of the loss of certainty and ease of enforce-
ment which is corollary to the empirical application of such an
amorphous "rule."
An area of law as imperspicuous as this is manifestly inappro-
priate for an aimless case-by-case approach, as amply demonstrated
by the pendulation, often out of phase, of the Commission and the
courts between a Rule-of-Reason approach and per se illegal treat-
ment,195 with the current emphasis tending to the latter. Satisfac-
tion of the divergent desiderata of certainty and flexibility requires
the establishment of meaningful guidelines for judging restrictive
dealing arrangements under a Rule-of-Reason test.
A major difficulty with this approach is in determining the
proper method of its accomplishment. The trend in the opposite
direction indicates that it is unlikely to happen in the Supreme
Court, absent a drastic change in judicial policy. A complete solu-
tion may require a major legislative overhaul of the antitrust laws
and enforcement procedures.196 Again, however desirable this may
be, its accomplishment appears to be unlikely in the foreseeable
195 See, e.g., Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrange-
ments Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 267.
196 The antitrust approach of the European Common Market provides a ready
model for comparison. The EEC Commission has granted a group exemption to "exclu-
sive distributorship" agreements on the grounds that
such arrangements allow the entrepreneur to concentrate his sales operations,
overcome linguistic and legal difficulties, and help to intensify a steady flow
of goods combined with a more rational distribution. They also offer small.
and medium-sized enterprises an opportunity to compete in markets otherwise
beyond their reach. Such exclusive distributorships as a rule also confer on
consumers an equitable share in the resulting benefit, improving supply pos.
sibilities and implying advantages from more efficient distribution. ComtoN
MKr. T.EP. 9162, at 8351 (1967).
The group exemption may be withdrawn
if there is reason to believe that the products covered by the agreement are
not competing with similar products in the area covered by the agreement,
that access to the sector of activity of the exclusive dealer is barred to other
dealers, or if the exclusive dealer exploits the group exemption to prevent
without good reasons groups of purchasers from obtaining supplies or to sell
the goods covered by the agreement at prices higher than warranted. Id.
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future. Consequently, the most likely solution would seem to be
through the enforcement agencies.
The merger area provides a ready model for the "guideline"
approach by the enforcement agencies. The Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice recently published its long awaited merger
guidelines,197 and the Commission has promulgated separate guide-
lines for vertical mergers of cement manufacturing companies and
their customers in the ready-mixed concrete business, 98 for vertical
mergers of food distribution and sales companies, 09 and for product-
extension mergers in the grocery manufacturing industry.2°° The
appropriateness of utilizing a more qualitative test for restrictive
dealing arrangements through a similar guideline approach is self-
evident. As the Supreme Court itself has noted, "integration by
merger is more suspect than integration by contract, because of the
greater permanence of the former."' 0'
In addition to the usual problems inherent in the dual anti-
trust enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Commis-
sion,202 strong arguments may be made for leaving regulation of
restrictive dealing arrangements solely to the Commission. The Com-
mission's peculiar expertise and mode of operation, with its unique
investigatory powers, rule-making authority, advisory opinion pro-
gram, and exclusively equitable powers, make it particularly well
equipped for the guideline approach. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion's individualized industry approach in its merger guidelines has
the dual merit of (1) outlining its enforcement policies in a narrower
industry context, with a resultant increase in certainty, and (2) per-
mitting more flexibility in applying the qualitative standard and
adapting its guidelines to the particular conditions in each industry.
As noted by Justice Brandeis in his celebrated dissent in FTC v.
Gratz, "Methods of competition which would be unfair in one in-
dustry, under certain circumstances, might, when adopted in another
industry, or even in the same industry under different circumstances,




2o1 United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 366 (1963).
202 Indeed, if uniform enforcement is the goal, some method of harmonizing
private antitrust actions also must be established to ensure its achievement. See Day,
Private Actions Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 29 A.B.A. AMrrrusr SEarioN 155
(1965).
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be entirely unobjectionable." 20 8 Finally, precedent for abdicating
jurisdiction over restrictive-dealing arrangements to the Commission
is found in the Department of Justice's virtually hands-off policy in
Robinson-Patman Act enforcement.
Although this approach may be criticized as smacking of gov-
ernment "regulation," it may be the only practical alternative to
achieving, with any degree of success, the elusive twin goals of cer-
tainty and reasonableness. That the Commission has the ability to
utilize the Rule of Reason is demonstrated in such cases as Carvel
and Motion Picture Advertising. Whether it would choose to adhere
to that policy in the future is, of course, problematical. There is
always the danger, as in bedding down with a well-intentioned horse,
that if it should decide to roll over the consequences could be di-
sastrous. But the current judicial trend to virtually per se illegal
treatment of restrictive dealing arrangements warrants the risk of
a trial.
203 253 U.S. 421, 436 (1920).
